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SUPERBIFURCATION: MAKING ROOM FOR
STATE PROSECUTION IN THE PUNITIVE
DAMAGES PROCESS
RICHARD W. MURPHY*
Punitive damages awards in tort cases have been a part of Anglo-
American law since the eighteenth century. Debate over their
propriety has raged ever since-particularly over the last two
decades or so. Neither side in this debate is likely ever to convince
the other. Richard Murphy argues, however, that we need not
wait for them to do so before finding ways to improve the fairness
of the punitive damages device. He suggests that states adopt a
reform he's named "superbifurcation." This reform would leave
private plaintiffs in charge of proving punitive liability but would
reward them for doing so with reasonable attorney's fees rather
than a chance to win punitive damages. State prosecutors would
have the option of bringing one punitive damages action against a
defendant found punitively liable in light of that defendant's
tortious course of conduct, and the state would collect any
punitive award. The reform would make the punitive damages
device more fair by: (1) removing the illegitimate influence of
plaintiffs' natural desires for maximum recovery from the
punishment process; (2) adding another layer of control to a
process which is alarmingly unconstrained in its present form; and
(3) reducing the dangers of repetitive punishment in the context of
mass torts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages are extra-compensatory awards that triers of
fact-generally juries-may award in their vast discretion to plaintiffs
in cases in which defendants have committed, in the colorful but
controversial taxonomy of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
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Virginia, "really mean" or "really stupid" torts According to most
courts, punitive damages are supposed to punish2 and deter such
serious wrongdoing.3 They are uncommon but, on rare occasions,
huge. Several juries have inflicted multi-billion-dollar punitive
awards; others have imposed awards running into the many millions.4
Although punitive damages have long been controversial the last
1. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887-88 (W. Va.
1992) ("Generally, the cases [in which defendants were found liable for punitive damages]
fall into three categories: (1) really stupid defendants; (2) really mean defendants; and,
(3) really stupid defendants who could have caused a great deal of harm by their actions
but who actually caused minimal harm." (footnote omitted)), affd, 509 U.S. 443 (1993)
(plurality opinion). For biting criticism of the West Virginia court's rhetoric and analysis,
see TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 472-73 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
2. "Punishment" carries two different meanings in discussions of punitive damages.
Sometimes, it is used in a broad sense to refer to acts taken to cause either retribution or
deterrence. Sometimes it is used in a narrower sense, however, to refer to acts taken only
to cause retribution, i.e., the infliction of just desserts. Courts use "punishment" in this
narrower sense when they state that the purposes of punitive damages are to punish and
deter, see, e.g., infra note 3, as such statements necessarily imply that to deter is not to
punish per se but to do something different. This punning on the word "punishment" may
be a result of the fact that there is no good verb to express the practice of inflicting pain
on another solely to cause retribution ("to retribute" is obviously an unhappy choice). In
any event, this Article, like other discussions of punitive damages, uses "punishment" in
both a broad and a narrow sense, trusting context to clarify meaning.
3. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996) ("Punitive
damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition." (citations omitted)). Although courts
typically reduce the purposes of punitive damages to punishment and deterrence, scholars
have identified a richer set of purposes served. See, e.g., David G. Owen, A Punitive
Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 373-74
(1994) (identifying education, retribution, deterrence, compensation, and law
enforcement as purposes of punitive damages). One commentator has identified at least
seven purposes for imposing punitive damages "gleaned from judicial opinions and the
writings of commentators: (1) punishing the defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from
repeating the offense; (3) deterring others from committing an offense; (4) preserving the
peace; (5) inducing private law enforcement; (6) compensating victims for otherwise
uncompensable losses; and (7) paying the plaintiff's attorneys' fees." Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.,
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1982).
4. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. App. 1987) (ordering
remittitur to $1 billion from $3 billion of jury's punitive damages award against Texaco
for tortious interference with contract), cert dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988); see also John
M. Broder, Louisiana Case Seen As Sign of Tort System Gone Awry, NEW YORK TIMES
NEWS SERV., Sept. 10, 1997, available in Westlaw, 1997 WL-NYT 9725203003 (reporting
jury's $3.5 billion punitive award against CSX Corporation and several other
transportation companies due to railway fire); Charles B. Camp, Exxon Must Pay, Alaska
Judge Declares, DALLAS MORNING J., Sept. 25, 1996, at 1D (reporting judge's refusal to
reduce $5 billion Exxon Valdez punitive award during post-trial proceedings). See
generally infra text accompanying notes 153-63 (discussing research on size of punitive
awards).
5. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342,382 (1873) ("The idea [of punitive damages]
is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence,
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twenty years in particular have marked a whirlwind of scholarly,
judicial, and legislative debate over their theoretical propriety and
practical effects.6  As a result, the law governing this odd, quasi-
criminal, quasi-tort "remedy" is in flux; many states have passed
reforms limiting the size of punitive awards, forcing plaintiffs to share
their extra-compensatory winnings with the state, and raising burdens
of proof.7 The Supreme Court has made several recent attempts to
force punitive damages to be "reasonable" by way of the Due Process
Clause.8 These reforms have not, however, changed the fundamental
nature of punitive damages: They remain a means for juries to club
malicious tortfeasors financially at the behest of private plaintiffs9
who then collect some or all of the proceeds. This device, in its
current form, undermines the law's legitimacy by injecting plaintiffs'
economic incentives for maximum personal recovery into the
punishment process; magnifies the unconstrained, "loose cannon"
nature of punitive awards; and invites particularly irrational
punishment of mass torts. States could ameliorate these problems by
adopting the following reform: Let private plaintiffs sue to prove
punitive liability and reward those that succeed with reasonable
attorney's fees. Give to the state, however, the power to bring one
punitive damages action to punish the tortious course of conduct of a
defendant thus found punitively liable. Call this reform, to coin a
term, "superbifurcation."
Criticisms of the traditional punitive damages regime are
legion." A few of the more notable are: (1) Compensatory damages
make plaintiffs whole, and therefore a plaintiff who wins a punitive
deforming the symmetry of the body of the law.").
6. For instance, a Westlaw search in the JLR database for titles including the phrase
"punitive damages" found 255 articles published from 1990-95. Search of Westlaw, JLR
Database (Nov. 1, 1997).
7. For a convenient listing of recent state reforms, see BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1618-20
(appendix to dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg).
8. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509
U.S. 443,458 (1993) (plurality opinion); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18
(1991).
9. A caveat: In some states, the state itself may seek a punitive award to punish
certain kinds of conduct. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-96.1 (1996) (allowing a state
agency to seek punitive damages against defendants for violations of environmental
laws). As the nature of its proposal makes clear, such state-brought actions are beyond
the purview of this Article, which suggests a reform designed to address the problems
inherent in the practice of permitting private parties to sue for and collect punitive
damages.
10. For a summary of such criticisms and critiques of them, see Owen, supra note 3,
at 382-400.
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award receives an unjustified "windfall";1 (2) On a closely related
note, private parties with an interest in maximum recovery have no
business arguing how harshly triers of fact should punish
defendants;12 (3) The culpable intent necessary to trigger a finding of
punitive liability is notoriously vague, and therefore, juries have
tremendous discretion in defining for themselves what combinations
of conduct and intent merit punitive damages; 1 (4) Similarly, juries
traditionally have enjoyed vast discretion in determining the size of
punitive damages awards' 4-- leading to such apparent
embarrassments as the four million dollar BMW paint job of recent
legal fame;' (5) Punitive damages, like criminal sentences, punish
tortfeasors, yet defendants enjoy none of the procedural protections
that form such a critical part of the criminal law;'6 and (6) In today's
mass-tort world, defendants can find themselves in "super-jeopardy"
nightmares in which numerous plaintiffs bring separate actions in
which separate juries inflict punishment over and over for one course
of conduct. 7 By far the most effective rhetorical weapon critics
possess against punitive damages, however, is their charge that
awards are "skyrocketing," crush industrial innovation, and are a
terrible drag on the economy.18
11. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,267 (1981).
12. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Life Ins. Co. of Ga., et al., at 11-12, BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (No. 94-896).
13. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 3, at 37-39.
14. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("In most
jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule
that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly
unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused.");
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REv. 975,
988-90 (1989) (discussing the immense scope of jury discretion in fashioning punitive
damage awards).
15. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598 (reversing the Alabama Supreme Court's decision to
uphold $2 million of the jury's $4 million punitive award inflicted on BMW for failing to
tell the plaintiff before he purchased his new BMW that it had been repainted due to
damage from acid rain).
16. See generally Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming
Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 passim (1983) (arguing that traditional
punitive damages violate due process and other constitutional protections).
17. See, eg., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1402 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Weis, J.,
dissenting), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993).
18. Justice O'Connor has repeatedly stated this concern:
Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently as a decade ago, the
largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate court in a products
liability case was $250,000. Since then, awards more than 30 times as high have
been sustained on appeal. The threat of such enormous awards has a
detrimental effect on the research and development of new products. Some
1998]
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Proponents of punitive damages counter that, in fact, awards are
not rising in number or size in any outlandish way." Furthermore,
critics' habit of breathlessly decrying isolated examples of huge
awards is misleading because, thanks to judicial review, such awards
often are reduced on remittitur or appeal.' From the point of view of
proponents of the current regime, it is vital that the critics' campaign
of distortion not succeed because punitive damages are a crucial
check on wrongdoing-especially corporate wrongdoing.21 Not to put
too fine a point on it, but, without punitive damages, the people of
America could find themselves driving repainted, exploding Ford
Pintos while washing down unsafe drugs with scalding coffee.' As
for the procedural niceties punitive damages are thought to offend,
extra-compensatory damages in some form or another have been
around for thousands of years.' Traditional common law punitive
damages have been a part of Anglo-American law for at least the last
230 years or so.' Any remedy that old cannot be all that irregular.2
manufacturers of prescription drugs, for example, have decided that it is better
to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a new pill or vaccine into the
market. Similarly, designers of airplanes and motor vehicles have been forced to
abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of
punitive damages.
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
19. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE
POLITICS OF REFORM 242 (1995) [hereinafter DANIELS & MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES].
20. See, e.g., Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability:
Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REV. 1, 53-54 (1992).
21. See, e.g., Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1276 (1993)
("This Article contends that the awarding of punitive damages is a necessary remedy
against the abuse of power by economic elites."). An interesting internal tension exists
between the stance of proponents of punitive damages that such awards are necessary to
deter misconduct and their response to critics' charges of "skyrocketing" awards that they
are generally rare and modest in size. To have a deterrent effect, punitive damages must
be awarded with some frequency--otherwise, tortfeasors need not fear them.
Determining what this frequency should be to create an optimal deterrent effect is, of
course, a mind-bogglingly difficult empirical question for which the present legal system
has not ascertained an answer. It is certainly logically possible for punitive damages to be
both rare and an effective deterrent. Nonetheless, it also seems fair to say that, to the
degree proponents of punitive damages minimize the frequency and size of such awards,
they also tend to undermine the argument that punitive damages operate as a meaningful
deterrent to bad conduct.
22. Cf. Rustad, supra note 20, at 80-82 (listing examples of safety changes
manufacturers made in their products after the imposition of punitive damages due to
flaws in those products).
23. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 36-78 (discussing history of common law
punitive damages).
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Punitive damages raise a host of thorny questions, and some of
them are virtually unanswerable. Most importantly in this regard, no
one knows just how big punitive awards should be to serve their
purposes best.' Retribution involves highly subjective judgments.
As the intense debate on the propriety of punitive damages itself
tends to demonstrate, no usefully precise consensus exists on how
much tort should equal how much financial retribution. Scaling
punitive awards optimally to deter wrongdoing also poses virtually
insurmountable problems, particularly as it is essentially impossible
to measure their deterrence effects in the world* It therefore makes
sense to greet with some skepticism both the claim that
"skyrocketing" punitive awards threaten industrial ruin and the
seeming stance of some proponents of the current system that any
reform that tends to lessen punitive awards threatens the safety of
the populace.
But one need not determine how big punitive damages must
be-to make the world the best possible world it can be-before
finding ways to make the process for imposing them fairer. Punitive
damages arose in our legal system because judges and juries
overseeing and deciding the outcomes of civil trials wanted to hurt
defendants whose conduct was particularly odious." Because of the
civil settings involved, the only tool with which these judges and
juries could hurt these defendants was damages-which plaintiffs
25. In this vein, Justice Scalia, though not a supporter of punitive damages per se,
commented in his concurrence in Haslip, "[s]ince jury-assessed punitive damages are a
part of our living tradition that dates back prior to 1868, I would end the suspense [over
their constitutionality under the Due Process Clause] and categorically affirm their
validity." Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
26. See generally infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text (discussing problems in
assessing proper size of punitive awards).
27. One scholar wryly noted in a discussion of the deterrence effects of products
liability punitive awards, "[l]ike so many empirical issues in law, the question of how
effectively the threat of punitive damages deters corporate misconduct is one that the side
with the burden of proof will almost certainly lose." E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive
Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053, 1060
(1989); see also Ellis, supra note 3, at 77 (observing that the dearth of empirical data
prevents definitive determination of whether punitive damages promote efficient
deterrence). This Article will return several times to the themes of burden of proof and
our relative ignorance concerning the effects of punitive awards in the world. See infra
text accompanying notes 164-75 (discussing problems inherent in determining the
"proper" size of punitive awards); infra section IV.A2. (arguing that the burden of proof
should be on those who favor continuing to permit private plaintiffs with financial
interests in maximum punishment to seek punitive damages).
28. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 43-68 (discussing examples of early
punitive damages cases).
1998] 469
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collect. This use of the usually compensatory tort system as a
mechanism for civil punishment causes punitive damages to violate
several norms that our legal system seems to hold dear in the
punishment of crime. Most obviously, permitting private plaintiffs to
borrow the machinery of state to punish wrongdoers and then collect
the proceeds allows the desire for money to influence the punishment
process in ways that we would now find intolerable for criminal
punishment. 9 Second, notwithstanding recent reforms, juries still
generally enjoy far more power to inflict punitive awards than they
do to cause criminal punishment-an arena in which the other
participants in the punishment process-the legislature, prosecutor,
and judge-together have exercised considerably more authority. If
one uses the divisions of power applicable to criminal punishment as
the appropriate benchmarks, then punitive damages tend to violate
the norm that the power to punish is so dangerous that it should be
carefully divided among several actors with the ability to check each
other?' Third, in the more limited mass tort context, the current
regime's practice of allowing an unlimited number of plaintiffs to
seek punitive damages virtually ensures that certain defendants will
be punished repeatedly for the same conduct. Punitive damages
therefore violate the norm of the criminal law-more or less
enshrined in the Double Jeopardy Clause-that the state should only
punish any given wrongdoing ("offense") once, not over and over.3
Prima facie, these norms all make great sense; no doubt most
people who think about such matters would agree that, as a general
rule, money ought not to influence punishment, the power to punish
should be carefully divided among several independent state actors,
and the state ought to have only one chance to harm a wrongdoer to
balance the scales of justice. Punitive damages are, at core, state-
enforced punishment. Because the present regime, however,
depends on private plaintiffs to seek punitive damages, permits them
to keep some or all of the proceeds, and fails to control the dangers
multiple plaintiffs pose for repetitive punishment, it violates these
otherwise entrenched notions of how to punish fairly. The state
therefore ought to have a reason for permitting the continued
existence of this practice in its present form. The argument in favor
29. See infra text accompanying notes 237-52 (discussing the role of the ostensibly
conflict-free prosecutor in criminal punishment).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 261-62 (discussing the role of separation of
powers in preserving liberty and preventing arbitrary punishment).
31. See infra notes 278-324 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of
repetitive punishment of mass torts).
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of the current system's thoroughgoing reliance on private plaintiffs
must be some variation on the private-attorney-general rationale:
Society gains by rewarding private parties for punishing wrongdoers
whom the state is too ignorant, uninterested, or busy to punish itself.
Society need not choose, however, between consistent
application of its norms of fair punishment on the one hand and
enjoying the private-attorney-general benefits of punitive damages-
such as they may be-on the other. The first step toward resolving
this false dichotomy is to recognize that just because the current
punitive damages regime evolved without a role for state
prosecutorial officials does not mean it has to stay that way. Of
course, it certainly would be unreasonable to expect prosecutors to
discover, investigate, and prove liability for malicious torts in
addition to all their other duties. To put solely prosecutors in charge
of the entire punitive damages process would be to abandon it
altogether. Plaintiffs have the information needed to prove
liability-they, after all, are more likely than anyone else to know
when they have been harmed by a tortfeasor. As a practical matter,
their participation is absolutely necessary to any scheme that
purports to reform rather than to abolish punitive damages.
Prosecutors, however, are the states' (ostensibly conflict-of-interest-
free) experts in bringing actions to punish, and, as is discussed in
more detail below, excellent reasons exist for giving them the sole
power to bring punitive actions of any sort-criminal or civil-where
at all practical. States should restructure their punitive damages
regimes to encourage plaintiffs and prosecutors to bring to bear these
respective strengths to cooperate in the process of inflicting punitive
awards against malicious tortfeasors.2
To reach this end, this Article proposes "superbifurcation" of
32. The qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, though they differ in many
critical respects from this Article's proposal, provide an example of a federal effort to
foster such cooperation and gain information from private parties to aid law enforcement.
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730 (1994). A private plaintiff (the "relator") may bring an action
against a defendant for making a false claim to the government. See id. § 3730(b). The
government has the option of stepping in to take control of the lawsuit or permitting the
relator to press the suit on her own. See iL § 3730(b)(4). If the defendant is found liable,
depending on the nature of the relator's participation, the court may award the relator
anywhere from zero to 30% of the damages proceeds as well as reasonable attorney's fees
and costs. See id. § 3730(d). Notably, the key factor in determining the size of the
relator's share is whether her suit was based on information the government did not
already have or could not readily obtain. See id. In cases where the relator's action is
based on specific information obtained from governmental sources or the news media,
"the court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more than 10
percent of the [damages] proceeds." Id
1998]
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staten procedures for determining punitive awards. A number of
states already bifurcate trials involving claims for punitive damages
into liability and damages phases, i.e., the plaintiff must first convince
the trier of fact that the defendant is liable for punitive damages as a
prerequisite to arguing how large these damages should be in a
separate phase of the trial.' Under the proposal, private plaintiffs
would continue to sue defendants to prove punitive liability. The
reward for proving liability, however, would not be to win the chance
for discretionary punitive damages (i.e., to play the jury lottery);
rather, courts would reward plaintiffs who successfully prove such
liability with reasonable attorney's fees. After the plaintiff has won a
judgment including a finding of punitive liability, the state (not the
private plaintiff-thus "super"-bifurcation) would be able to bring
one punitive damages action against the defendant to punish it in
light of all acts committed within the state as part of the defendant's
tortious course of conduct and all harms flowing from such acts. The
defendant would be estopped from denying the facts that gave rise to
the underlying finding of punitive liability, but the prosecutor would
be free to prove any other facts about that course of conduct that
might justify an increased award. In no case would the trier of fact,
however, be able to award greater punitive damages than the amount
requested by the prosecutor. The defendant would pay any final
punitive award to the state, which would first use such funds to defray
the expenses the prosecutor's office incurred in bringing the punitive
damages action, and then deposit any remainder in its general fund.'
Superbifurcation would give better expression in the punitive
damages process to the three norms of fairness discussed above.
33. This Article's proposal focuses upon traditional, common-law, discretionary
punitive damages and is presented and discussed as a potential state-law reform because
such damages are essentially creatures of state law. With minor adjustments, however,
superbifurcation also could work as a federal reform in those contexts in which a federal
cause of action authorizes discretionary punitive damages.
34. See infra note 91 (listing examples of bifurcation statutes).
35. For variations on the theme that plaintiffs who win punitive damages under the
present regime should win only attorney's fees, see generally Dan B. Dobbs, Ending
Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV.
831, 888-908 (1988) (suggesting that the tort system abandon attempts to use damages to
inflict retribution and that attorney's fees could serve as an appropriate measure for
damages designed to deter misconduct), and Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff's
Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1911-16 (1992)
(suggesting that punitive damages in excess of plaintiff's attorney's fees should be payable
to the state). Neither of these proposals, however, envisions putting state prosecutors-
the state's punishment experts, as it were-in charge of bringing the punitive damages
actions that determine how harshly to punish defendants who have committed outrageous
torts.
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First, it would eliminate the influence of money as the motivating
factor for punishment by ending the practice of permitting private
plaintiffs-and their attorneys, by way of contingency fees-to win
extra-compensatory windfalls by collecting what are essentially civil
penalties. A state official sworn to uphold the law in a neutral
manner should be the one to argue in court how a defendant should
be punished-not a plaintiff's lawyer with an inevitable and huge
financial conflict-of-interest. Second, giving the prosecutor a
"charging" role in the punitive damages process would have the
beneficial effect of reducing the vast and troubling power juries
currently enjoy over punitive damages determinations. Third, by
allowing only one punitive recovery per wrongful course of conduct
per enacting state, the proposal would help rationalize the
punishment of mass torts-lessening the problem inherent in the
present system that, in situations involving multiple plaintiffs, juries
operating independently of each other may punish defendants over
and over for the same, or at least overlapping, conduct.
Part II tells the tale of how punitive damages came to be,
examines recent efforts by the Supreme Court and the states to
reform the current regime, and finishes with observations about the
frequency and size of punitive awards and how little we know about
their actual effects in the world. With this background in mind, Part
III explains the superbifurcation model in more detail, discusses its
constitutionality, and demonstrates why it would neither overwhelm
state officials nor unacceptably reduce the power of the current
regime to punish and deter serious wrongdoing. Part IV then
discusses the ways in which the suggested model would make the
process for inflicting punitive awards fairer and more legitimate.
Stepping back to look at the larger picture, this Article does not
try to answer the question of whether punitive damages are a good
idea, i.e., whether they are a sensible way to punish and deter in a
remotely cost-effective way. In this vein, it adopts an aggressively
agnostic attitude on the issue of just how big punitive awards should
be, as a substantive, empirical matter, to inflict optimal retribution
and to best deter. Because we do not have such information, we
should not feel too attached to the rate and size of punitive awards
that the present system generates. Thus, our ignorance frees us to
experiment, to alter the punitive damages process to match norms of
fairness that are ingrained in the approach the criminal law takes to
punishment; our ignorance frees us to adopt superbifurcation to
remove the taint that plaintiffs' natural desires for maximum
recovery bring to punitive awards, to reduce the alarmingly
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concentrated power of juries to inflict them, and to lessen somewhat
the risk of repetitive punishment.
II. THE ClURRENT PuNITIVE DAMAGES REGIME
A. Some History
Legal codes have mandated multiple damages awards-close
cousins of discretionary punitive damages-for thousands of years."
As the name indicates, multiple damages multiply the value of the
plaintiff's injury times a given number to arrive at total damages.
Like discretionary punitive damages, multiple damages punish
wrongdoers by making them pay a judgment higher than the harm
they have caused. One can find such provisions in the laws of the
Babylonians and Hittites, and in the Hindu Code of Manu.3 The
Code of Hammurabi, for example, stated that if a man stole an ox
from a temple, he would be fined thirty oxen. The Hebrew Bible, by
contrast, required an ox-thief merely to pay five oxen to his victim
per stolen ox.4 Multiple damages first appeared in English law in
1275 in a statute that imposed double damages for trespass against
religious persons.4' The treble damages allowed in antitrust actions
are an obvious modem-day American example of this practice.42
English courts first explicitly adopted the doctrine of punitive
36. For summaries of the origins and development of punitive damages law from
Hammurabi to the present day, see Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 24-29 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), GERALD W. BOSTON, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN TORT LAW § 1 (1993), 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 1-19 (3d ed. 1995), and Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 1284-
1304.
37. See BOSTON, supra note 36, § 1:2, at 2 (citing ancient examples of this practice).
38. See id. § 1:2, at 2 n.3.
39. See id (citing G.R. DRIVER & JOHN C. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 500
(1952)).
40. See Exodus 22:1. Apparently, it was a better idea to steal oxen in ancient Israel
than in ancient Babylon.
41. See Owen, supra note 3, at 368 n.23 (citing Synopsis of Statute of Westminster I, 3
Edw., ch.1. (Eng.), reprinted in 24 STATUTES AT LARGE 138, (Danby Pickering ed.,
1761)).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994). This statute provides that
[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by ... reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has
an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
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damages in its current form, i.e., that juries have the discretionary
power to fashion tort awards to punish and deter, in 1763 in the
fascinating cases of Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money." Many of
the core issues discussed in these cases remain central to the punitive
damages debate today-indicating that, although judges and scholars
have poured rivers of ink into the subject, perhaps our understanding
of this device has not advanced so very far in the last two hundred
years. Both cases arose out of the suppression of The North Briton,
Number 45, a pamphlet that allegedly libeled King George II. John
Wilkes, a member of Parliament, was the publisher and author.' The
Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, issued a general warrant authorizing
a search of Wilkes's house.4 Acting under the authority of this
warrant, Wood and several King's messengers and a constable
entered Wilkes's house, broke his locks and seized his papers.47 In his
subsequent suit for trespass, Wilkes sought £5000 in damages, arguing
that "trifling damages would put no stop at all" to such horrible
misconduct and that "large and exemplary damages" were
necessary.'
The Solicitor-General responded with an argument that has been
made time and again over the last two hundred years-that
punishment is the province of the criminal law. Marveling at the size
of the damages claim, he remarked:
Is Mr. Wilkes, at any event, entitled to tenfold damages?
This was the first time he ever knew a private action
represented as the cause of all the good people of England.
If the constitution has, in any instance, been violated, the
Crown must be the prosecutor, as it is in all criminal cases.49
In another rhetorical move that no doubt has been made by countless
defense attorneys arguing against punitive awards, the Solicitor-
General "then made a general observation to the jury, that it was
their duty to hear the cause coolly and dispassionately, without any
bias to one side or the other."'
Perhaps the Solicitor-General's plea that punishment should be
left to the Crown would have had more force if the man ultimately
43. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
44. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
45. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 490.
46. See U
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 493.
50. Id.
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responsible for the search of Wilkes's home and the seizure of his
papers had not been one of the King's most powerful ministers. In
any event, Lord Chief Justice Pratt's instructions to the jury could not
have made the defense happy. He began by stressing the enormous
evils of general warrants:
His Lordship then went upon the warrant, which he
declared was a point of the greatest consequence he had
ever met with in his whole practice. The defendants claimed
a right, under precedents, to force person houses; break
open escrutores, seize their papers, &c. [sic] upon a general
warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus
taken away, and where no offenders['] names are specified
in the warrant, and therefore a discretionary power given to
messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance
to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a Secretary of
State, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect
the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and
is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject."1
He then turned to the jury's power to remedy such abuses:
And as for the precedents, will that be esteemed law in a
Secretary of State which is not law in any other magistrate
of this kingdom? If they should be found to be legal, they
are certainly of the most dangerous consequences; if not
legal, must aggravate damages. Notwithstanding what Mr.
Solicitor-General has said, I have formerly delivered it as
my opinion on another occasion, and I still continue of the
same mind, that a jury have it in their power to give
damages for more than the injury received. Damages are
designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but
likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any
such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the
detestation of the jury to the action itself.'
Thus, according to the Court, in addition to compensating plaintiffs,
damages may punish, deter, and express community outrage. The
jury accepted this invitation to use civil damages as a means to club
the defendants and awarded £1OO.5
Lord Halifax's general warrant also gave rise to the related case
of Huckle v. Money, 4 which emphasized the important point that
courts should refuse to interfere with jury determinations of the
51. Id. at 498.
52. Id. at 498-99 (emphasis added).
53. See id. at 499.
54. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
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proper size of punitive awards in all but the most extreme cases. s
The authorities suspected that Huckle, a journeyman printer, had
helped print The North Briton, Number 45." They arrested and held
him for six hours-during which time they fed him steaks and beery
He sued for trespass, assault, and imprisonment." The defense
sought a new trial on the ground that the jury had imposed excessive
damages when it awarded the plaintiff £3000."
The Lord Chief Justice was not sympathetic to the defense's
plight. He began with an observation that is as true now as it was two
hundred years ago-the measure of damages for tort "is vague and
uncertain, depending upon a vast variety of causes, facts, and
circumstances ... [because] torts or injuries which may be done by
one man to another are infinite."'  He opined that, given the
authorities' good treatment of Huckle, the maximum value of his
actual personal damages was perhaps £20. Nonetheless, the court
approved the £300 verdict, and, in the course of doing so, stressed the
need for judicial review of tort awards to remain extremely
deferential, remarking, "that it is very dangerous for the Judges to
intermeddle in damages for torts; it must be a glaring case indeed of
outrageous damages in a tort, and which all mankind at first blush
must think so, to induce a Court to grant a new trial for excessive
damages.""
Punitive damages soon made their way to America. Wilkes and
Huckle arose out of a massive breach of the public's trust by the
Secretary of State-a sort of 1760s Watergate. By contrast, some of
the first known American cases to invoke explicitly the doctrine of
punitive damages involved breaches of private or professional trust.
For instance, in the 1784 South Carolina case of Genay v. Norris,2 the
plaintiff accused the defendant-physician of poisoning him.' While
drunk, the two had decided to duel.' The defendant thought better
of this plan and suggested that he and the plaintiff have another drink
55. See id. at 769.
56. See id. at 768.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See L
60. Id.
61. Id. at 769 (emphasis added). Of course, these observations in Huckle remain true
to this day. The measure of damages for torts is still often vague and uncertain-
especially in the context of punitive damages.
62. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784).
63. See id, at 6.
64. See id.
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instead.' Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the defendant laced the
drink with a dose of cantharides (Spanish Fly), which caused the
plaintiff horrible pain.6 The court did not accept the defendant's
excuse that he was only joking and charged the jury that this injury
entitled the plaintiff to "very exemplary damages, especially from a
professional character, who could not plead ignorance of the
operation and powerful effects of this medicine.,1 7 The jury
responded to the court's instruction by awarding £400.6
Wilkes and Huckle involved great issues of abuse of state power;
Genay arose out of a sick joke. Still, the underlying judicial impulse
behind all three is obvious: The defendants in each case had done
something the court and jury considered terrible-something
downright criminal. Forcing the defendants to pay only
compensation to the victorious plaintiffs did not seem suitably severe,
so the judges and juries in these civil, private actions-unburdened by
formalist concerns about the proper provinces of criminal and tort
law 9 -did not hesitate to use the power at their disposal to order
payment of damages to make the defendants feel pain."
This practice became entrenched in American law. In 1851, the
Supreme Court in Day v. Woodworth1 stated that
[i]t is a well-established principle of the common law that, in
actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury
may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive or vindictive
damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of
his offence rather than the measure of compensation to theplaintiff.72
65. See id.
66. See id
67. Id. at 7.
68. See Genay, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 7. Another very early punitive damages case,
Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791), also could be characterized as involving a form of
breach of a private trust in that the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of a promise to
marry. See id. at 77. The court instructed the jury "not to estimate the damages by any
particular proof of suffering or actual loss; but to give damages for example's sake." Id.
69. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA.
L. REv. 1423, 1424-25 (1982) (describing the attempts of legal thinkers to divide the law
sharply into public and private realms as a peculiarly nineteenth-century phenomenon).
70. In his seminal 1931 article, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, Professor Clarence
Morris put the matter this way: "The punitive damage doctrine is evidence of an age-old
feeling that the admonitory function [of tort law] is sometimes entitled to more emphasis
than it receives when judgments in tort actions are limited to compensation." Clarence
Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173,1206 (1931).
71. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851)
72. Id. at 371. But cf. Owen, supra note 3, at 369 & n.29 (questioning the Court's
legal scholarship in Day and suggesting that punitive damages were not actually a settled
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Punitive damages remained controversial, however. In 1872,
Justice Foster of New Hampshire wrote what must be scholars'
favorite quote on the subject: "The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous
heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the
symmetry of the body of the law." 3 Justice Timlin of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin felt rather differently:
The law giving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the
English love of liberty regulated by law. It tends to elevate
the jury as a responsible instrument of government,
discourages private reprisals, restrains the strong, influential
and unscrupulous, vindicates the rights of the weak, and
encourages recourse to, and confidence in, the courts of law
by those wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not
cognizable in, or not sufficiently punished by the criminal
law.74
Eminent scholars, too, clashed over the propriety of punitive
damages.75 For instance, Professor Simon Greenleaf of Harvard,
author of a major treatise on evidence, had a formalist bent, and
argued that extra-compensatory damages had no place in tort law-
which was supposed to compensate plaintiffs, not punish
defendants.76  By contrast, Theodore Sedgewick, author of an
important treatise on damages, favored them as a practical means to
control misconduct.' Justice Foster's and Professor Greenleaf's
feelings notwithstanding, the doctrine that juries had discretion to
award punitive damages for outrageously tortious behavior became
law in almost every state.78
One must be careful, however, when making generalizations
about the states' varying punitive damages regimes. 9 Particularly
part of American jurisprudence in 1851).
73. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872). Justice Foster had a way with words; he
continued, "[N]ot reluctantly should we apply the knife to this deformity, concerning
which every true member of the sound and healthy body of the law may well exclaim,---'I
have no need of thee.'" Id. at 397.
74. Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 17,20 (Wis. 1914).
75. For a discussion of such disputes, see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 1298-
1301.
76. See 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253 (16th
ed. 1899).
77. See 1 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
§ 354 (9th ed. 1920).
78. See Owen, supra note 3, at 369 (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
DAMAGES 278-79 (1935)).
79. For instance, although most states historically have allowed common law punitive
damages, a few do not: Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Washington
permit them only as authorized by statute. See Owen, supra note 3, at 369 n.30.
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since the advent of the current wave of reform, they have become
somewhat idiosyncratic." Nonetheless, one can give a general
description of the law of punitive damages applicable in most places."'
Before awarding punitive damages, the trier of fact (the jury, as a
practical matter) must find that the defendant acted with "malice"-
some level of culpable intent worse than mere negligence." The jury
then determines how large an award is necessary to inflict sufficient
retribution on the defendant and to deter future misconduct." The
vague nature of this task necessarily gives juries truly vast discretion
in determining how harsh an award to inflict."
Judicial review of punitive awards somewhat lessens this vast
power: A defendant whom a jury has found liable for punitive
Nebraska goes even further; its courts have interpreted their state constitution to forbid
punitive damages. See Distinctive Printing and Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566,
574 (Neb. 1989).
Exceptions also exist to the general tendency of states to justify punitive damages as
a means to punish and deter wrongdoing. Connecticut and Michigan instead permit
punitive damages as augmented compensation to capture plaintiffs' attorney's fees and
other uncompensated losses. See Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 222 A.2d
220, 225 (Conn. 1966); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 242 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Mich. 1976).
See generally Ellis, supra note 3, at 3-12 (discussing the various purposes ascribed to
punitive damages); Owen, supra note 3, at 373-81 (same).
80. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (citing examples of recent statutory
reforms in various states).
81. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins, Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (discussing the
"traditional common-law approach").
82. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1993) (requiring a showing that defendant
"consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with
regard to the plaintiff"); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring plaintiff
to show the defendant engaged in "oppression, fraud, or malice"); IDAHO CODE § 6-
1604(1) (1990) (requiring that plaintiff show that defendant's conduct was "oppressive,
fraudulent, wanton, malicious, or outrageous"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20.1(a) (West
Supp. 1997) (requiring that plaintiff show the defendant showed "deliberate disregard for
the rights or safety of others"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979)
("Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others."). For
commentary on the lawyerly habit of pretending these words mean much, see Dobbs,
supra note 35, at 840-41 (condemning as pointless the use of "abstract conclusory words"
to define the standard of conduct for punitive damages and concluding "[w]e probably
cannot go beyond saying the conduct must be seriously wrong ... and that it must be
accompanied by a bad state of mind").
83. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15 ("Under the traditional common-law approach, the
amount of the punitive award is initially determined by a jury instructed to consider the
gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful conduct.").
84. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (characterizing a Vermont state court's instruction that a jury
should "take into account the character of the defendants, their financial standing, and
the nature of their acts" as "an admonition [to the jurors] to do what they think is best"
when determining punitive awards).
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damages may request that the trial court review the amount of the
award for excessiveness.' This review is not de novo in the sense that
the judge is not free to substitute his or her own notion of an ideal
award for what the jury actually imposed. Rather, as a general rule,
the judge is supposed to take steps to modify a punitive award only if
"the verdict was based upon prejudice, bias, or passion, was based
upon a mistake of law or fact, was lacking in evidentiary support, or
was shocking to the judicial conscience."' If a judge concludes that
the award is too high, a not infrequent event, then he or she can order
remittitur-i.e., give the plaintiff the choice between accepting a
lesser award or enduring a new trial.' If the defendant is unhappy
with the results of the trial court's review, the defendant may, of
course, appeal, but the appellate court will review the trial court's
85. See Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,421-26 (1994) (discussing the
English and American history of deferential review of jury awards for excessiveness).
86. BOSTON, supra note 36, § 30:41, at 49-50 & nn.51-54 (collecting cases). The view
that judges should exercise great deference when reviewing the amounts of punitive
awards is no longer universal, however. In federal court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59 provides the standards governing whether the district court may order remittitur. See
FED. R. CIv. P. 59; Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279. This standard has generally been
understood to be quite deferential; however, the Fourth Circuit recently took a different
view. See Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594
(4th Cir. 1996). In Atlas, the court noted that Rule 59 permits judicial interference with a
jury verdict that is against the weight of the evidence, is based on false evidence, or will
result in a "miscarriage ofjustice." Id. (emphasis added). Where a verdict is rooted in the
jury's view of the facts, the court should exercise considerable deference. See id.
According to the Fourth Circuit, however, determining the amount of a punitive award
does not involve a factual determination. Rather, these awards are rooted in jury policy
determinations; they require the sort of judgment that judges exercise when imposing
criminal sentence. See id The court went on to observe that "a jury, which is called upon
to make that 'sentencing' type of judgment only in the single case before it, is relatively
ill-equipped to do so." Id. Judges, by contrast, "are required frequently to impose
penalties for punishment and deterrence in a wide array of circumstances, both in civil
and in criminal contexts." Id. Judicial institutional competence therefore requires judges
to take an active role in reviewing punitive awards to determine whether they violate the
"miscarriage of justice" standard of Rule 59. See id. In this vein, the court concluded that
"punitive damages determinations involve a partnership between ajury and trial judge ...
in which the judge inevitably enjoys the final word." Id. at 595.
87. See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1373 (3d Cir.) (en bane) (reducing to $1
million a $25 million jury punitive award that had already been reduced by the district
court to $2 million), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 391 (Ct. App. 1981) (affirming trial court's decision to reduce
$125 million punitive award to $3.5 million); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d
768, 866 (Tex. App. 1987) (reducing $3 billion punitive award to $1 billion). See generally
MARK PETERSON ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 27-29 (1987) (estimating that, due to post-trial review, defendants
actually pay approximately 50% of punitive damages awarded in the first instance by
juries).
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actions only for abuse of discretion."
B. Recent Reforms
Whatever the merits of the current punitive damages debate, it
certainly has had a dramatic effect on the legal landscape. State
legislatures have enacted and state courts have decreed a panoply of
reforms.89 The Supreme Court, for its part, has tried to rein in
punitive awards by constitutionalizing a rough "reasonableness"
requirement, holding, in essence, that "grossly excessive" awards
violate due process.' For present purposes, however, the most
important point to make about reform efforts of the last decade or so
is that they have not altered the fundamental nature of the current
regime. In nearly all states, punitive damages remain a chance to
play a jury lottery that entices financially interested parties to try to
punish malicious torts.
1. Reform in the States
Over the last ten to twenty years or so, most states have taken
significant steps designed to make the punitive damages process
fairer to defendants. For instance, many states now bifurcate trials so
that punitive liability and the amount of the punitive award are
determined in separate trial phases." At least one of the goals of this
88. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279; BOSTON, supra note 36, § 30:43, at 52.
89. See generally BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1618 app. (1996)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (appendix listing state reforms).
90. See, e.g., id, at 1592 ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits a State from imposing a 'grossly excessive' punishment on a tortfeasor." (citing
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993))). Congress, too,
has attempted to reform the law of punitive damages. See, e.g., Common Sense Legal
Standards Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 201(f) (1995), reprinted in 141
Cong. Rec. H2941-48 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1995). The bill was vetoed by President Clinton
on May 2, 1996. See Message on Returning Without Approval to the House of
Representatives the Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, 32 WKLY. COMP. PRES.
DOC. 780,780-81 (May 6, 1996).
91. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing defendant to
apply for bifurcation of liability and damages phases; admitting evidence of defendant
wealth only in damages phase); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d) (Supp. 1996) (requiring
that liability for punitive damages and amount of such damages be decided in separate
phases of trial); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(a) (1994) (requiring trier of fact to
determine punitive damages liability and the court then to determine amount of such
damages in subsequent proceeding); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (1995) (requiring
jury first to decide liability for punitive damages, then to decide amount in separate
proceeding); Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.263(1)-(3) (Supp. 1992) (allowing any party to apply
for bifurcation of liability and damages phases, with evidence of defendant's wealth
admissible only in damages phase); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2) (1996) (requiring jury
to find defendant liable for punitive damages as prerequisite to admissibility of
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reform is to prevent evidence of a tortfeasor's wealth, which, in many
states, may be considered in determining the appropriate size of
punishment, from tainting determinations of liability. Also, many
states have raised the evidentiary burden of proof for plaintiffs,
making them prove punitive liability by clear and convincing
evidence rather than by a mere preponderanceY The rationale for
this reform, of course, is to reduce the risk that juries will incorrectly
find "malice," i.e., punitive liability, where none "exists." More
radically, a few states have tried to address the problem of controlling
juries by granting to judges the power to determine the amount of
punitive awards.93
In addition to making these and other procedural reforms,
roughly one-half of the states have limited the size of some categories
of punitive awards, either in absolute terms (a plaintiff can win no
more than $X) or as a multiple of any underlying compensatory
award (a plaintiff can win no more than Y times compensation).'
tortfeasor's wealth).
92. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1993); CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294(a); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-2 (Michie 1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 549.20.1(a) (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(1)(a).
93. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(a); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2315.18,
2315.21(C)(2) (Anderson 1995) (amended 1996); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
240b (West 1991) (delegating to judges the power to determine the size of punitive
awards in products liability actions). Plaintiffs have attacked both the Kansas and the
Ohio measures as infringing the right to jury trial guaranteed by their respective
constitutions. The Kansas measure survived this state constitutional challenge. See Smith
v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 998 (Kan. 1993). The Ohio measure did not. See Zoppo v.
Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397,401 (Ohio 1994).
94. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a)(3) (1987) (limiting punitive
damages generally to the amount of actual damages); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b
(West 1991) (requiring that punitive damages in product liability actions not exceed twice
the compensatory award); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a)-(b) (West 1997) (requiring
that punitive damages generally be limited to three times the compensatory damages);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(e) (1994) (requiring that punitive damages generally be
limited to the lesser of defendant's highest gross annual income in the preceding five
years or $5 million); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005(1) (Michie 1986) (capping punitive
damages for most categories of torts at three times the compensatory award where that
award is $100,000 or more and at $300,000 where the compensatory award is less than
$100,000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (1996) (limiting punitive damages to the
greater of twice compensatory damages or $250,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie
1992) ("In no event shall the total amount of punitive damages [against all liable
defendants] exceed $350,000.").
Had President Clinton signed it, the Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act of
1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995), would have capped products liability punitive awards
at the greater of twice compensatory damages or $250,000 in actions against defendant
companies worth more than $500,000. For an analysis indicating that such a cap-if
applicable to all punitive awards-would affect only about ten percent of them, see
Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
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This capping of awards no doubt reassures defendants worried by
multi-million dollar awards that at least some limits exist to their
exposure to punitive damages. To people who believe that juries
routinely hand out excessive awards, this is no doubt a good thing.'
A significant number of the states have addressed the windfall
problem by passing "allocation" measures that require a victorious
plaintiff to split any punitive award with the state. This reform is an
interesting half-measure. It somewhat lessens the embarrassment
that private plaintiffs and their attorneys can win enormous windfalls
from punitive awards over and above compensatory damages.
Nonetheless, forcing plaintiffs to split punitive awards with the state
still leaves them with windfalls-albeit smaller ones. Allocation
measures seem tacitly to recognize that plaintiffs really ought not to
keep such "winnings," but let them keep some fraction anyway.
In sum, states have passed reforms designed to strengthen
623,655-56 (1997).
95. On a conceptual level, however, it is interesting to note (and some have) that caps
arguably are inconsistent with the avowed purpose of punitive awards-to punish and
deter. Punitive damages can be assessed for all sorts of different kinds of behavior and
against all kinds of defendants. Presumably, the size of an award needed to punish and
deter depends on the facts of the wrongdoing and the circumstances (including the
wealth) of the defendant. In other words, the size of the award should depend on the
facts of the case. Caps are arbitrary numbers that bear no relation to particularized
inquiry into punishment and deterrence. Professor Morris made this point nearly 70 years
ago with the following frequently cited example. Suppose a man recklessly shoots into a
crowd but, by a stroke of luck, causes only $10 of damage to someone's eyeglasses. If the
punitive award is limited to, for instance, three times compensatory damages, then the
maximum punitive award would be $30, a sum that bears no obvious relation to the need
to punish or deter the reckless shooter. See Morris, supra note 70, at 1181; see also
Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damages Caps and the Profit Motive: An
Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 304, 330 (1991) (noting that caps may deprive
courts of the ability to fit punitive awards to the facts of the given case). For a defense of
caps from this charge, see infra text following note 268 (discussing this problem from a
perspective informed by separation of powers).
96. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987) (repealed 1995) (allocating
one-third of punitive award to the state) (struck down as authorizing unconstitutional
takings in Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 272-73 (Colo. 1991)); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.73(2)(a)-(b) (West 1997) (allocating 35% of punitive awards to the state)
(upheld against a due process challenge by Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033, 1035-38 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992)); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2)
(Supp. 1997) (allocating 75% of awards of punitive damages to the state, "less a
proportionate part of the cost of litigation, including reasonable attorneys fees") (upheld
as constitutional in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 637-39 (Ga. 1993)); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1207 (West Supp. 1997) (granting courts discretion to distribute
punitive award among plaintiff, plaintiff's attorney, and the state); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.675 (Supp. 1992) (allocating to the state 50% of punitive damages remaining after
payment of expenses and fees); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(b) (1995) (allocating 60% of
punitive damages to the state); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1996) (allocating 50% of
punitive damages in excess of $20,000 to the state after payment of fees and costs).
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defendants' procedural protections from jury prejudice or error, to
limit the size of punitive awards, and to force victorious plaintiffs to
share the proceeds of punishment.
2. Reform at the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has shown a marked interest in punitive
damages over the last decade or so. The effect of this interest has
been to subject punitive awards to a very loose due process scrutiny.
The essence of this scrutiny is that awards that are " ' "grossly
excessive"' "' and "jar [a judge's] constitutional sensibilities""
violate due process. The Court's road to constitutionalizing this
necessarily standardless (and thus, in a sense, lawless) layer of review
bears close examination, as it illustrates one of the central difficulties
confronting those seeking to rationalize punitive damages by insisting
on "reasonable" awards: Just as the Lord Chief Justice remarked in
1763, the measure of tort damages-certainly punitive damages, in
any event-is "vague and uncertain."" No practical, stable frame of
reference exists for determining the substantive reasonability of
awards designed to punish and deter. Trying to corral punitive
damages by way of free-floating reasonableness or excessiveness tests
is a bit like trying to lasso the wind.
The Supreme Court grappled with the due process implications
of punitive damages in 1991 in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip."' Ruffin, an agent of Pacific Mutual, had pocketed the health
insurance premiums of city employees of Roosevelt City, Alabama."'
The policies of these employees soon lapsed, which a number of them
discovered to their dismay after receiving medical care."2 Cleopatra
Haslip and several other plaintiffs sued Ruffin for fraud and sued
Pacific Mutual under the theory of respondeat superior."3 The jury
returned a general verdict of $1,040,000 for Haslip.1' Pacific Mutual
appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which upheld the
97. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1592 (1996) (quoting
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993) (quoting Waters
Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86,111 (1909))).
98. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
99. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768,768 (C.P. 1763).
100. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
101. See i& at 5.
102. See id. at 4-5.
103. See id. at 5-6.
104. See id. at 7 n.2.
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punitive damages award. 5 It then appealed t6 the Supreme Court,
arguing that Alabama's method for calculating awards violated the
Due Process Clause because it allowed "unbridled jury discretion."'' "
The Supreme Court rejected Pacific Mutual's wholesale attack
on Alabama's punitive damages regime. It remarked that, under the
"traditional common-law" approach, a jury determined the size of a
punitive award by considering "the gravity of the wrong and the need
to deter similar wrongful conduct," and that then the trial and
appellate courts reviewed the award for reasonableness." The Court
observed that every federal and state court that had reviewed the
propriety of this method had ruled that it did not violate due process
per se."°8 The Court agreed with this venerable line of authority,
noting that "' "[i]f a thing has been practised [sic] for two hundred
years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the
Fourteenth Amendment to affect it." ,,... It recognized, however,
that "unlimited jury discretion ... in the fixing of punitive damages
may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional
sensibilities.""' In this vein, the Court observed that "general
concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court ...
to [the] jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus."",
The Court therefore examined the Alabama courts' approach to
punitive damages to make sure it provided such "adequate
guidance." It gave its stamp of approval12 to the following
instruction given to the Haslip jury:
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is
not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury. It is to punish
the defendant. Punitive means to punish or it is also called
exemplary damages, which means to make an example. So,
if you feel or not feel, but if are reasonably satisfied from
the evidence that the plaintiff, whatever plaintiff you are
talking about, has had a fraud perpetrated upon them and as
direct result they were injured in addition to compensatory
damages you may in your discretion award punitive
damages.
105. See i. at 7.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 15.
108. See id. at 15.
109. Id. at 17 (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (quoting
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22,31 (1922))).
110. Id. at 18.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. See id. at 19-20.
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Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary
damages is to allow money recovery to the plaintiffs, it does
to the plaintiff, by way of punishment to the defendant and
for the added purpose of protecting the public by detering
[sic] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the
future. Imposition of punitive damages is entirely
discretionary with the jury, that means you don't have to
award it unless this jury feels that you should do so.
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the
amount, you must take into consideration the character and
the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and
necessity of preventing similar wrong."'
The Court stated that this instruction gave the jury "significant" (a
marvelous understatement) but not "unlimited" discretion." It
added that "[t]he instructions thus enlightened the jury as to the
punitive damages' nature and purpose, identified the damages as
punishment for civil wrongdoing of the kind involved, and explained
that their imposition was not compulsory."' "
The Court also approved of Alabama's use of the following
factors to govern post-trial and appellate review of punitive awards:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the
punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from
the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has
occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the
defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence
and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to
the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability
of removing that profit and of having the defendant also
sustain a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant;
(e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal
sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken
in mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards
against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be
taken in mitigation."'6
The Court concluded that "application of these standards ... imposes
a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of
113. L at 6 n.1; see also id. at 19-20 (discussing the effect of these instructions).
114. Id. at 19.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 21-22 (citing Central Ala. Elec. Coop. v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371, 377 (Ala.
1989); Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218,223-24 (Ala. 1989)).
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Alabama factfinders in awarding punitive damages." ' Of course, the
problem with this last conclusion is that the Court provided no
guidance as to how to weigh these factors, leaving this type of review
endlessly manipulable.
Lastly, the Court eyeballed the size of the actual punitive
damages award, noting that it was four times as large as the
compensatory damages award and 200 times Haslip's out-of-pocket
expenses, as well as far greater than the fine for insurance fraud in a
criminal context. It decided, however, that "in this case [the award]
... does not cross the line into the area of constitutional
impropriety. '1
Boiling down the due process approach of Haslip to its essence
reveals that, at a constitutional minimum: (1) courts should cabin
jury discretion by telling jurors what punitive damages are for; (2)
courts should then review such awards for "reasonableness," perhaps
using a multi-factor test (that can, frankly, justify just about
anything); and (3) finally, courts should make sure awards are not too
big. This characterization is not meant as a flippant criticism of the
Court. Rather, it is meant to highlight the central problem
confronting judicial control of punitive awards. If punitive damages
are meant to deter and punish civil wrongs, then the size of awards
should be reasonably related to fulfilling these purposes. As is
discussed in more detail below, however, there is no stable frame of
reference in the ad hoe world of punitive damages for determining
how much wrong needs how much punishment and deterrence."9
Instead, such awards are necessarily initially a product of a
factflnder's guided, or perhaps not-so-guided, intuition. Judges who
then review these awards quite naturally apply their own intuitions to
this job. As a general rule, however, legal culture does not permit a
judge to justify overturning a jury verdict by saying that the size of an
award struck him or her as just plain crazy. In the punitive damages
context, the Court has responded to this problem by listing factors
courts should consider in reviewing awards-offering a rhetorical
cloak to cover judicial discretionary review of punitive awards and
creating the illusion that the process is more constrained and ordered
than it is.
The Supreme Court's next foray into punitive damages law,
117. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22.
118. Id. at 24.
119. See infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
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TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., dramatically
exposed the malleability of post-Haslip review of awards. The
petitioner, TXO, had brought a bad faith claim for oil and gas
development rights even though it knew that the respondent,
Alliance Resources, held perfectly good title to them.12' A West
Virginia jury found TXO liable for slander of title and awarded
$19,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive
damages.'2 As in Haslip, the trial court denied motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for remittitur.'2 The Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed?2 Before the United States
Supreme Court, TXO argued that because the punitive award was
526 times greater than actual damages, it was so excessive that it
necessarily violated the Due Process Clause.'2 A plurality of the
Court disagreed and held that the damages award was reasonable
because TXO's scheme would have netted millions of dollars had it
succeeded. The $10 million award was appropriately commensurate
with these potential ill-gotten gains.'2 This conclusion is not absurd,
but, coming from a court that just two years earlier had implied that a
punitive award four times the size of a compensatory award raised
serious constitutional concerns, it indicates that perhaps factor-listing
does not do much to control punitive damages review coherently."
The Court continued its efforts to corral punitive damages with
the Due Process Clause in the 1996 case of BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore.m BMW had a policy of not disclosing to the buyer
damage to a new car when it amounted to less than three percent of a
new car's value. 9 Dr. Gore sued BMW for selling as new a car that
had been repainted to repair damage from acid rain, causing him
perhaps $4000 in actual damagesYm He argued that a $4 million
punitive award was appropriate, however, because BMW had sold
120. 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion).
121. See id. at 448-49.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 451-52.
124. See &L at 452 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d
870, 875 (W. Va. 1992)).
125. See id. at 453,459.
126. See id. at 461-62.
127. See id. at 480-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (condemning the emptiness of the
plurality's reasonableness review).
128. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
129. See id. at 1592-93.
130. See id. at 1593.
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roughly one thousand repainted cars as new."' The jury agreed and
awarded the full $4 million.' The Supreme Court of Alabama ruled,
however, that the jury improperly had computed the amount of
punitive damages based on occurrences happening outside of
Alabama and thus beyond the power of Alabama juries and courts to
punish, a proposition with which the Supreme Court later agreed.'
Because the jury should have based its award on the fourteen
repainted cars sold in Alabama, the Alabama high court ordered
remittitur reducing the award to $2 million.1m
The Supreme Court ruled that this award violated due process.
The first sentence of the majority opinion cites TXO for the
proposition that, "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a 'grossly excessive'
punishment on a tortfeasor."' The legitimate purposes of punitive
damages are punishment and deterrence. "Only when an award can
fairly be categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to these
interests does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'3'
The Court's rule that punitive awards may not be "grossly
excessive" sounds like a creature of substantive due process.
However, having stated this principle, the Court then turned to a
form of notice inquiry. In essence, it concluded that BMW had no
way of knowing that Alabama would inflict a $2 million punishment
131. See id.
132. See id. at 1594.
133. BMW sent somewhat mixed signals on this issue. The Court clearly noted that a
state may not use punitive damages to punish or deter conduct that is lawful where it
occurred. See id. at 1597-98. It reserved judgment, however, on whether a state "may
properly attempt to change [by way of punitive damages] a tortfeasors' [sic] unlawful
conduct in another State." Id. at 1598 n.20. However, in support of the first
proposition-that states may not impose punitive awards for conduct that was lawful
where it occurred-the Court cited precedent to the effect that states cannot give their
laws extra-territorial application generally. See id. at 1597 n.16. If that is the case, then it
is difficult to see how a state could use its own punitive damages law to punish and deter
out-of-state conduct regardless of its legality where it occurred. Nonetheless, the Court
also stated that out-of-state conduct is relevant to determining the "reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct," id. at 1598 n.21, and thus is presumably also relevant to the issue of
how harshly the defendant should be punished. So out-of-state conduct apparently can
justify increased punishment after all. Thus, the power of states to use out-of-state
conduct as a basis for punitive damages is bounded, but it is not entirely clear just where
the boundaries lie.
134. See id. at 1595 n.10. It is not clear where this $2 million figure came from. At
least the jury had some math on its side.
135. Id. at 1592.
136. Id. at 1595.
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due to a nondisclosure policy that was legal in many other states.'37
This lack of notice caused the award to violate due process. In this
vein, the Court announced three "guideposts" to aid analysis:
Three guideposts, each of which indicates that BMW did not
receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the sanction
that Alabama might impose for adhering to the
nondisclosure policy adopted in 1983, lead us to the
conclusion that the $2 million award against BMW is grossly
excessive: the degree of reprehensibility of the
nondisclosure; the disparity between the harm or potential
harm suffered by Dr. Gore and his punitive damages award;
and the difference between this remedy and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.'
In short, the Court reasoned that what BMW had done was not all
that bad; 9 Dr. Gore had suffered only $4000 in damages,' and the
maximum civil penalty for violation of Alabama's Deceptive Trade
Practices Act is $2000.' Given these facts, Alabama blindsided
BMW by upholding $2 million of the jury's $4 million award.
At a very quick first glance, BMW might seem to provide a
slightly more meaningful approach to due process scrutiny than
Haslip and TXO. Part of this appearance stems from the fact that in
BMW, unlike its two predecessors, the Court actually struck down an
award as grossly excessive. Also, the Court's instruction to use the
civil penalties available under statute to guide calculation of punitive
damages seems refreshingly concrete and number-bound. However,
the "guideposts" are, like the factors approved in Haslip, actually
tools for justifying an intuitive decision rather than reaching a
"reasoned" one. Because the Court could not, in the nature of
things, provide a definitive and non-arbitrary answer for how much
wrong equals how much money, it could not provide a meaningful
framework for how the guideposts should be applied or how they
should interact. As Justice Scalia remarked in dissent, "[t]he Court
has constructed a framework that does not genuinely constrain, that
does not inform state legislatures and lower courts-that does
nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon
its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular award of
137. See id. at 1598.
138. Id. at 1598-99.
139. See id. at 1599.
140. See id. at 1602 (noting that the ratio of the $2 million award to the $4000 actual
harm was 500 to 1).
141. See id. at 1603 (citing ALA. CODE § 8-19-11(b) (1994)).
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punitive damages was not 'fair.' ,142
Thus, to summarize recent reform efforts, the Supreme Court
has tried to control punitive damages with a reasonableness approach
which, while it signals a certain hostility to high awards and no doubt
spurs courts to review them more actively, can justify just about any
conclusion a judge wants to reach. Many states have thrown up
procedural hurdles of various sizes to winning punitive damages,
passed allocation statutes, and capped the amounts juries can award.
Nonetheless, even in reform states, it generally is true that juries
continue to enjoy vast discretion both to decide whether defendant
conduct merits punitive liability and to determine the size of punitive
awards.
C. General Observations About Punitive Damages: Some Things We
Know, and Some We Don't
A few general observations concerning the theory and practice
of punitive damages should frame any suggestion that yet another
attempt at reform of the system is needed. Thanks to recent
scholarly efforts, we have more and more empirical data concerning
the frequency and amounts of punitive awards. Contrary to what
some critics of the system might have one believe, juries exercise
their vast discretion to impose such awards relatively rarely.
Regardless, however, of whether punitive awards have "skyrocketed"
over the last several decades (in some senses a rather sterile question
of characterization), mean awards have substantially risen, and, on
occasion, juries have found defendants punitively liable for amounts
that are huge by anyone's standards. It is critical, however, to bear in
mind how little we actually know concerning the implications of these
data. If knowledge requires more than somewhat educated
guesswork and anecdote, then we do not actually know whether, as a
general matter, punitive awards under the present system are too
high or low to serve best their ostensible purposes of retribution and
deterrence. In this same vein, we do not actually know whether, on
balance, the purported safety benefits of punitive damages in
discouraging misconduct are worth the purported costs of stifling
valuable technological and industrial innovation. 43 From such
agnostic observations the following picture emerges: On infrequent
occasions, juries use punitive damages to cause financial pain-
142. d. at 1614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. See generally Elliott, supra note 27 (discussing problems inherent in determining
whether punitive damages deter corporate misconduct).
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sometimes an enormous amount of it-to defendants who have
behaved especially badly; we do not understand-at least not very
well-the effects in the world of these financial beatings.
1. The Frequency of Punitive Awards
Punitive damages awards are far rarer than critics of the current
regime might have one think. A recent study, led by Professor
Theodore Eisenberg of Cornell Law School, surveyed jury verdicts in
forty-five of the seventy-five most populous counties in the country
for the fiscal year July 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992.1' It found that juries
awarded punitive damages in roughly 3% of all civil trials.45 Other
studies confirm this finding and reveal that this rate seems to have
remained fairly constant over the last fifteen years or so. For
instance, a RAND Corporation study published in 1996 compared
the punitive award rates in fourteen counties for 1985-89 and 1990-
94.146 It found that juries awarded punitive damages in 4.2% of all
civil verdicts from 1985 to 1989 and in 3.6% of all civil verdicts from
1990 to 1994.'4 Reaching back in time a little further, Stephen
Daniels and Joanne Martin analyzed 25,627 civil jury verdicts from
forty-seven counties during 1981 to 1985. Their study found that
juries awarded punitive damages in 4.9% of all civil verdicts (1287 of
the 25,627).1' None of the studies purports to be truly national in
scope. Nonetheless, a comparison of the Daniels and Martin 1981-85
rate (4.9%) to Eisenberg's 1991-92 rate (roughly 3%) and the RAND
Corporation's 1990-94 rate (3.6%) indicates that there is little reason
to think that juries have become much more willing to grant punitive
damages over the last fifteen years.
Such figures mask considerable geographical variation,
144. See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 632-33.
145. See id. at 10. Plaintiffs win a compensatory award in roughly half of civil trials. It
follows that they win punitive damages in approximately 6% of those trials in which they
win compensation. See id.
146. See ERIK MOLLER, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, at 55 (1996).
The rate of punitive awards across the whole fourteen-county sample was fairly constant
between these two time periods. However, some counties within the survey experienced
large fluctuations in the numbers of awards inflicted. For instance, there were 51 punitive
awards in Cook County, Illinois, in 1985-89, but only 29 in 1990-94. See ad at 34.
147. See id. at 55-56.
148. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1990); see also DANIELS & MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES, supra note 19, at
214-15 (finding, in a survey of 19,404 civil jury verdicts from 1988-90, that juries awarded
punitive damages in 4.5% of all verdicts, or 8.3% of those in which plaintiffs won
compensation).
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however.149 In the Eisenberg study, juries awarded no punitive
damages in thirteen of the forty-five counties surveyed."i ' In three
counties, however, juries awarded punitive damages in over 20% of
civil verdicts. These counties were: San Francisco County,
California, in which plaintiffs won in 64 civil trials and received
punitive damages in 17 of them (26.56%); Fulton County, Georgia, in
which plaintiffs won 62 civil trials and received punitive damages in
16 of them (25.81%); and Dallas County, Texas, in which plaintiffs
won 129 civil trials and received punitive damages in 29 of them
(22.48%).5 It bears noting that there is little reason to think such
percentages remain constant from year to year in any given
jurisdiction."
2. The Size of Punitive Awards
Less complete data are available on the size of punitive awards,
but a sampling of recent studies indicates that mean awards have
grown substantially over the last several decades. Daniels and
Martin have analyzed the growth in the size of punitive awards from
1970 to 1990 in four sample counties-Cook County, Illinois; Dallas
County, Texas; Jackson County, Mississippi; and Los Angeles
County, California." In three of the four sites-Cook, Dallas, and
Jackson-median awards remained relatively constant throughout
this twenty-year period, although they sharply rose in Los Angeles.'m
By contrast, mean awards substantially rose in all four jurisdictions
over this time-especially in Cook and Los Angeles. 5 For instance,
the mean award in Cook increased from on the order of $100,000 in
149. The likelihood of a punitive award also varies by category of tort. The Eisenberg
study found, unsurprisingly, that juries are more likely to grant such awards in categories
of cases that necessarily involve some form of evil intent. See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at
637. Punitive awards are particularly likely, for instance, where the defendant has
committed an intentional tort (punitive damages awarded in 21% of such cases where the
plaintiff won compensation) or where the defendant has fraudulently breached a contract
(19% of plaintiff "wins"). See id Punitive awards are much less likely in medical
malpractice (3% of plaintiff wins) and products liability (3% of plaintiff wins) cases. See
150. See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 640.
151. See id. Harris County, Texas, with 44 punitive awards, had the most such awards
of any county surveyed in the Eisenberg study. See id.
152. See MOLLER, supra note 146, at 34 (noting large variations in the number of
punitive awards between 1985-89 and 1990-94 in some sample jurisdictions).
153. See DANIELS & MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES, supra note 19, at 227-38.
154. See id. at 227.
155. See id. at 231-32.
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1970-75 to in excess of $2 million in 1986-90.6 The authors
attributed this contrast in median and mean increases to substantial
growth in the size of "high-end" verdicts-the larger verdicts in the
punitive damages continuum became much larger in all four
jurisdictions, which tended to drag the mean of awards much
higher."
The 1996 RAND study also analyzed changes in the amounts
juries award, comparing awards made in the fourteen sample
counties during 1984-89 with those made during 1990-94." 8 The study
concluded that juries tended to grant higher awards during the latter
period but that the trend was not uniform-in five of the fourteen
counties mean and median awards decreased." Also, variations
between these two time periods in amounts awarded (regardless of
direction of such change) were often large; for example, the study
noted that "[m]edian awards increased from $29,000 to $250,000 in
Cook County [Illinois] and from $62,000 to $215,000 in Harris
County [Texas]; they decreased from $320,000 to $180,000 in
Manhattan [New York] and from $652,000 to $31,000 in Erie County
[New York]."'"
In addition, the RAND study compared maximum punitive
awards in its sample jurisdictions, revealing a checkered pattern:
Maximum awards increased between the two time periods in seven
sample counties but decreased in the other seven.161 In either event,
the maximum punitive award for all fourteen counties during both
periods was astoundingly large-during 1984-89 a Harris County jury
imposed a punitive award of several billion dollars; during 1990-94 a
Los Angeles County jury imposed an award of several hundred
million dollars."
Of course, one must be very careful in using studies with such
small samples to generalize about the state of the tort system
nationwide. A few propositions suggest themselves, however. The
Daniels and Martin study indicates that mean awards rose
substantially between 1970 and 1990, but that this increase was
largely fueled by increases in high-end verdicts. The RAND study
arguably suggests that any "skyrocketing" stopped by about 1990
156. See Ud at 232 fig.6.5.
157. See i at 231.
158. See MOLLER, supra note 146, at 36-38.
159. See iL at 36-37.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 37.
162. See id.
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because, while the study concludes that awards generally have
increased from 1984-89 to 1990-94, it also reveals a highly checkered
pattern of increase and decrease across its fourteen sample counties.
Leaving aside, however, the characterization problem of whether it is
fair to say that punitive awards have "skyrocketed" (and, if so, when
and how much), perhaps the most important and indisputable fact
about the size of modern-day punitive damages awards is crystal
clear: On rare occasions, juries will use their power to assess punitive
damages to compel defendants to pay plaintiffs astounding amounts
of money, sometimes running into the millions of dollars, and, on
several occasions, the billions.'
3. Problems in Assessing the Proper Size of Awards
Critics often discuss the problem of punitive damages as if it
were overwhelmingly obvious that juries routinely impose awards
that are crazily harsh and that the civil justice system has run
completely amok;1" they frequently use anecdotal evidence of awards
that sound outlandishly high at first blush to back these criticisms.16
Given that punitive awards sometimes involve amounts of money
that are startling by just about anyone's standards, such anecdotes are
ready at hand. However, to return to the problem implicit in Haslip,
TXO, and BMW, it is probably impossible to quantify meaningfully
how often juries "overdo it"; as Justice Kennedy remarked in his
concurrence in TXO:
To ask whether a particular award of punitive damages is
grossly excessive begs the question: excessive in relation to
163. See supra note 4 (noting the $3 billion Texaco, $5 billion Exxon Valdez, and'$3.5
billion CSX Corp. verdicts).
164. For instance, a prominent critic of the current tort system recently wrote:
Our mechanism for the peaceable resolution of civil disputes has transmogrified
into an insatiable organism that is devouring a segment of our society and
culture from the inside-out. Like the giant underground fungus discovered
several years ago in Michigan, which manifests itself above the ground only in
the form of an occasional mushroom, our civil justice system parasite is barely
perceptible to the average person on a day-to-day basis, except for the
occasional but increasingly frequent news reports of a freakish lawsuit or [an]
outlandish jury verdict. But the destructive process is nevertheless continuously
at work, growing and relentlessly consuming vital resources and disabling our
productive capacity.
Theodore B. Olson, The Parasitic Destruction of America's Civil Justice System, 47 SMU
L. REV. 359, 359 (1994) (footnote omitted). For a critique of the rhetorical techniques
often used by the proponents of reform, see DANIELS & MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES, supra
note 19, at 205.
165. See Olson, supra note 164, at 360.
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what? The answer excessive in relation to the conduct of
the tortfeasor may be correct, but it is unhelpful, for we are
still bereft of any standard by which to compare the
punishment to the malefaction that gave rise to it. A
reviewing court employing this formulation comes close to
relying upon nothing more than its own subjective reaction
to a particular punitive damages award in deciding whether
the award violates the Constitution. This type of review, far
from imposing meaningful, law-like restraints on jury
excess, could become as fickle as the process it is designed
to superintend.1"
For a jury to award an incorrect punitive award, it must award
either more or less than that needed to cause the optimal amount of
retribution and deterrence. However, no consensus frame of
reference exists for determining how much retribution is warranted
in any given case. Practically speaking, the same is true for
deterrence calculations. Therefore, it is impossible to measure
sensibly how often and how badly juries inflict "unreasonable"
punitive awards.
This point is most obvious with regard to retribution. Juries
necessarily base their retribution determinations to some degree on
subjective fairness concerns. Suppose a jury awards $1 million in a
products liability case because the defendant maliciously ignored the
dangerousness of the widget it manufactured. A critic of punitive
damages might respond by asserting that, even if the act was
malicious, a $500,000 award would have been plenty to serve
retribution purposes.
Who is right, the jury or the critic? These judgments are too
value-laden and idiosyncratic to provide a stable framework for
criticism of punitive damages in any but the most extreme cases.
Each person examining a given award has his or her own intuitive
reaction molded by knowledge, self-interest, and values as to whether
it feels right. In a given case, an award might be sufficiently far from
the examiner's notion of the correct amount to motivate the
examiner to say the award was "wrong." She would reach this
judgment with more and more confidence as the monetary distance
between her notion of the optimal award and the actual award grew.
Eventually, the examiner would confidently say that the award was
crazy and that all right-thinking people who knew the facts would
agree. One can imagine hypotheticals in which this judgment of
166. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 466-67 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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craziness undoubtedly would be correct in some sense. For example,
every sane person should agree that a jury would be crazy to award a
plaintiff $5 trillion because the defendant maliciously failed to shovel
his walk after a snowstorm, thus causing the plaintiff to slip, fall, and
bruise a hip. Actual punitive damages awards, however, are not that
absurd-certainly not to the juries that impose them, and certainly
not to the passionate defenders of the current regime.
Where a single punitive award is supposed to cause both proper
retribution and deterrence, the inevitable subjectivity of the
retribution component taints analysis of the whole award-including
the deterrence component. Imagine a judge were able to determine
the optimal amount of deterrence "needed" in a given case, but that
the jury awarded a greater amount. Unless the jury returned a
special verdict that specifically allocated its punitive award between
retribution and deterrence, one could attribute the surplus above
optimal deterrence to the jury's subjective retribution determination.
Thus, a judge typically cannot say a punitive award is excessive
merely because it exceeds the judge's notion of how large an award is
needed to deter.
In any event, "calculating" deterrence awards poses its own
difficulties, particularly where the conduct to be deterred is not
profit-motivated. As a threshold matter, the civil justice system is
slow and uncertain, whereas effective deterrence is commonly
understood to require swift, certain sanctions.167 Therefore, the
deterrent effect of punitive damages may not be great.
Compounding difficulties, deterrence is not an on-off switch but
instead involves innumerable shades of gray. Suppose a defendant
has been found liable for assaulting a plaintiff. With regard to
specific deterrence, probably no damages award is high enough to
guarantee that he will never assault again. All one can say is that a
stiff enough punishment probably will have some effect on his
behavior. With regard to general deterrence, no one can honestly say
with any degree of precision how awards of any given size on any
given defendant affect the conduct of others. At what point in a sea
of unknowables is a jury to say enough is enough for deterrence?
Deterring profit-motivated torts poses some of the same
problems, as well as some all its own. To begin, such torts often
involve corporate culprits. Deterrence uses pain to influence future
behavior. Corporations cannot feel pain and thus cannot be deterred.
167. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 27, at 1062 (discussing factors that are generally
understood to govern the deterrent effects of sanctions).
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Instead, one must deter the people who run them and work for them.
If punishment for a corporate misdeed comes at all, it may come very
late, particularly for products liability claims-most notably in this
vein, asbestos cases have challenged actions that occurred decades
before the plaintiffs brought suit." The persons actually responsible
for tortious acts may not suffer even indirectly from a punitive
damages judgment against a corporate defendant; indeed, they may
be long gone from the scene by the time any such judgment arrives." 9
Thus, the people who actually make corporate decisions that cause
tortious harm may have little to fear personally from punitive
damages, which minimizes whatever mild deterrent value they may
have. Of course, if punitive damages are not an effective tool with
which to deter, it makes little sense to worry too much about
determining "optimal," non-effective awards.
Leaving such problems to one side, however, profit-motivated
torts at least offer the mirage that the calculation of deterrence
awards can be relatively objective."' To deter a profit-seeking actor
from repeating a given kind of conduct, one must, of course, create
circumstances such that the actor, faced with the opportunity to
misbehave again, will conclude that to do so would not be profitable.
The following gross oversimplification suggests how a jury might try
to do so. First, it must determine how much profit the defendant
gained from the tort at issue so that the jury can take that profit
away, and the defendant will learn that it cannot keep ill-gotten
gains."' Where the defendant's benefit from the tort exceeds the
168. See id. at 1062 (citing Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 476 (N.J.
1986) (rejecting the argument that stockholders should not be punished 50 years after the
fact for the misdeeds of asbestos companies in the 1930s)).
169. See id, at 1063 (suggesting that "punitive damages against corporations for events
far in the past are like 'corruption of the blood,' the ancient common law remedy that
punished the children for the sins committed by the parents" (footnote omitted)).
170. For discussions of how to structure punitive awards to deter profit-motivated
behavior, see STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 162 (1987),
Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 1143 passim (1989), and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient
Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3,29 (1990).
171. See Dobbs, supra note 35, at 874-76 (suggesting that one way to enhance the
deterrence value of punitive damages would be to use them to force defendants to
disgorge ill-gotten profits). It bears noting, however, that basing punitive damages on an
attempt to take the profit out of conduct assumes that the goal of punitive awards should
be to deter conduct because a jury has determined this conduct is tortious and should be
prevented. Efficiency analysis (of the sort discussed by the articles cited in the previous
note) suggests a different analysis. If a defendant derives more profit from the conduct
than the plaintiff derives harm, then the conduct increases the wealth of society (even
though it makes the plaintiff poorer). Although it is proper to take steps to ensure the
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value of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff, full
deterrence will require a punitive award to make up the difference.
The analysis does not end there, however, because one could not
expect an award only as large as profits from a past tort to deter
future torts. Not all tort victims sue. If a victim successfully sues and
wins only the defendant's ill-gotten gains from that tort, then the
defendant is no worse off than if it had done no wrong in the first
place. If the victim does not sue, then the defendant keeps
everything. Excluding for the moment the real-world considerations
of attorney's fees and loss of reputation, torts become a no-lose
situation for the tortfeasor. To deter future torts, the jury must inflict
an award that makes the defendant absorb this "enforcement
error."' To do so, the jury could multiply the defendant's profits
from the tort by the inverse of the risk the defendant perceived it
faced of incurring a judgment due to its behavior." For example,
suppose a jury decides a defendant wrongly profited $1 million from
a fraud and that the defendant probably figured there was roughly a
10% chance that its victim would sue and win. To deter, the jury
should assess $10 million dollars in total damages ($1 million times
10, the inverse of 1/10); the extra $9 million of punitive damages is to
teach the defendant that, in the future, it should not commit torts on
the gamble that it will retain profits because some victims do not sue
and win.
Of course, one of the problems with this sort of analysis is that it
assumes that juries can intelligently determine the enforcement error
involved in any given case. 74 In the example just given, how is the
jury supposed to arrive at this 10% figure? How often do victims of
this sort of tort sue and win? Does anyone know? How do the
idiosyncratic facts of a case affect analysis of enforcement error? If
such questions cannot be answered with some degree of specificity,
defendant internalizes the plaintiff's loss, the legal system should not set damages so high
as to remove all incentives for the defendant's wealth-increasing behavior. Assuming the
correctness of this view, to ensure optimal deterrence, the tort system should strive to
ensure that defendants pay for all harms they cause plaintiffs. See, e.g., Cooter, supra
note 170, at 1149 (using harm to plaintiff as the basis for measuring deterrence damages).
Where defendants must do so, they will engage in conduct only where they expect the
benefits of acting to exceed the harms inflicted on plaintiffs, i.e., they will act to increase
societal wealth.
172. See Cooter, supra note 170, at 1149-50 (discussing the problem of "enforcement
error").
173. See iL at 1150.
174. For criticism suggesting such approaches are unrealistic, see Jerry J. Phillips, A
Comment on Proposals for Determining Amounts of Punitive Damage Awards, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 1117,1118-19 (1989).
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then enforcement-error type analysis can have only limited
usefulness as a tool to make the calculation of punitive awards for
profit-motivated torts something more than intuitive guesswork.
In sum, there is no consensus frame of reference for
"calculating" retribution awards or deterrence awards for non-profit-
motivated torts. Calculating deterrence awards for profit-motivated
torts perhaps offers a theoretical hope of some objectivity, but that
hope may be chimerical.
None of this discussion, however, is meant to imply that punitive
damages never cause appropriate retribution or that they never deter
tortious conduct. Nor is it meant to suggest that juries never impose
"crazy" awards. It is merely to observe that punitive damages are not
a precision tool that juries use to fine-tune the behavior of
defendants and potential tortfeasors. They are a financial club that
juries use, to paraphrase the Lord Chief Justice loosely, to express
outrage, to take revenge upon defendants, and to try to slam sense
into them-as well as everyone else who may consider committing
malicious torts in the future."5 Perhaps it is not such a good idea to
hand juries this club (an issue this Article does not directly address),
but to pretend or imply that consistent, remotely precise, non-
arbitrary standards exist to govern juries' use of this crude tool is
absurd.
IlL. A PROPOSAL FOR ANOTHER LAYER OF REFORM: MAKING
ROOM FOR THE STATE IN THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROCESS
The central thesis of this Article is that the punitive damages
regime would be better if state officials, rather than financially-
interested private parties, prosecuted claims for punitive awards.
Implicit in what already has been said, however, are two arguments
against tinkering with the current regime in this fashion. First, juries
rarely inflict punitive awards. They are therefore probably not animminent threat to the safety or health of the Republic, and thus
there is no pressing need for reform. Second, no remotely precise,
non-arbitrary standards exist for determining the optimal size of
punitive awards. If, as a general matter, one cannot meaningfully
determine whether any given award is substantively "correct," then,
lacking such a frame of reference, it is difficult to see how one could
175. Cf. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.P. 1763) ("Damages are
designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to
the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the
detestation of the jury to the action itself.").
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justify reforms designed to make such awards "better."
One answer to these threshold arguments: Perhaps
paradoxically, when it is difficult or impossible to assess the
substantive propriety of legal actions, it is all the more important that
the process for determining them be, and appear to be, as fair as
possible. For instance, one can see this proposition at work in the
way courts review discretionary decisions by agencies. For an agency
decision to involve meaningful discretion, several outcomes must be
legally permissible. Suppose an agency takes an action that, on its
face, appears to be plausibly within the agency's zone of discretion,
i.e., it is not apparent that the decision is substantively "wrong" or
"unreasonable." A court may nonetheless reject this action if the
agency's consideration of irrelevant, improper factors tainted the
process by which it reached its decision."' Of course, the need for fair
procedures should be at its peak where the state uses discretionary
powers to inflict punishment on those within its grip. Punitive awards
are a relatively rare but sometimes surprisingly harsh form of
punishment. Thus, it is important that they both be and appear to be
fair.
The current punitive damages regime, however, violates several
norms of fairness that limit the ways in which the state can inflict
criminal punishment Three examples: First, although allocation
statutes lessen this problem, plaintiffs win an unjustified windfall
whenever they collect extra-compensatory damages. This potential
for windfalls creates an obvious and massive conflict of interest for
plaintiffs and their attorneys when they argue how harshly
defendants should be punished; it creates the appearance-and
presumably the reality, in many cases-that the desire for money
improperly influences punishment. Second, even though judges
review punitive awards for excessiveness and many state legislatures
have recently imposed caps limiting their size, juries exercise an
alarmingly vast amount of power in awarding punitive damages. The
lessons of separation of powers, especially as applied in the criminal
law, teach that such a concentration of power in any one entity in the
punishment process is dangerous and encourages arbitrary results.
Third, in cases involving mass torts, because the present system
176. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (examining the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard); Yepes-Prado v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Agencies abuse
their discretion no less by arriving at plausible decisions [i.e., decisions that appear
reasonable] in an arbitrary fashion than by reaching unreasonable results." (emphasis
added)).
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allows each plaintiff claiming harm to bring his or her own action for
punitive damages, separate juries may grant successive awards that
repetitively punish the same conducts in contravention of the premise
of the criminal law embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause that the
state should punish any given "offence" only once. 7
The basic rationale behind all three of these norms is that the
manner in which the state intentionally inflicts pain on its citizens
should be carefully limited and controlled. Prima facie, this basic
premise should apply to all forms of state punishment, not just those
labeled "criminal."'' 8 Again, punitive damages are, at core, a form of
state-inflicted punishment. It follows that the state should carefully
limit and control the process by which it authorizes their imposition.
In short, all three of these norms that control criminal punishment
should, to the extent practicable, govern punitive damages as well.
Money should not influence their prosecution, the power to inflict
them should be carefully divided, and defendants should not have to
face needlessly repetitive "jeopardies."
States could, with relative ease, make their punitive damages
regimes better reflect these norms by adopting this Article's
superbifurcation proposal, which would encourage private plaintiffs
and public prosecutors to cooperate in the process of punishing
malicious tortfeasors 79 The remainder of Part III first provides a
model statute, discusses the constitutional concerns it raises, and then
analyzes the effects it would have on the rate and size of punitive
awards, as well as the rate and size of settlements in cases involving
plausible punitive claims. Part III concludes that these effects would
not be demonstrably objectionable-superbifurcation would reform,
not destroy, punitive damages. Part IV then makes the affirmative
case for reform, discussing the three ways in which the proposed
model would enhance the fairness of the punitive damages process.
177. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]").
178. Cf United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) ("The notion of
punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and
the criminal law, and for the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction constitutes
multiple punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, we must follow the notion
where it leads.").
179. This proposal is presented as a state reform because punitive damages largely are
rooted in state law. However, with minor alterations, the proposal also could work as a
federal reform where a federal cause of action authorizes an award of punitive damages.
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A. A Model Superbifurcation Statute
The following is a sketch of a hypothetical state statute that
creates a cooperative punitive damages process by splitting the duties
of proving punitive liability and seeking punitive damages between
private plaintiffs and public prosecutors, respectively:
Section 1) The court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of costs to any plaintiff who proves the defendant's
punitive liability by demonstrating that the defendant
tortiously injured the plaintiff and further demonstrating by
[whatever standard of proof the enacting state chooses] that
the defendant committed this tort with malice or reckless
disregard for the plaintiff's rights;
Section 2) The Attorney General may bring one action for
punitive damages against any defendant found punitively
liable under Section 1 for all acts committed within [the
enacting state'l as part of the defendant's tortious course of
conduct and all harms... caused by such acts;
(a) In such an action, the defendant will be estopped
from denying the facts necessarily proven in the course
of reaching an underlying finding of punitive liability;
(b) The trier of fact may in no case award greater
damages for the defendant's malicious course of
conduct than the amount requested by the Attorney
General;
Section 3) Punitive damages assessed against a defendant in
a punitive damages action under Section 2 shall be payable
to the Office of the Attorney General, which will retain
from any such damages an amount sufficient to compensate
for any resources it expended in prosecuting the punitive
damages action and will pay any remainder to the Office of
the Treasury.
This model.' builds on the premise of the current system that
180. This bracketed qualification and the one that follows are necessary in light of the
Supreme Court's admonitions on the territorial limits of the states' power to punish in
BMW. See supra note 133.
181. This model is not meant as a complete description of a punitive damages regime.
For instance, it does not speak to pleading procedures, burden of proof, caps on awards,
or whether private plaintiff actions should be bifurcated into compensatory and punitive
liability stages. For the most part, the proposal is consistent with whatever approach an
enacting state wishes to take to such issues, e.g., the proposal should work regardless of
what burden of proof a state chooses for issues of punitive liability or whether it caps
punitive awards, etc. Of course, the exception to this general rule is that superbifurcation
is not consistent with allocation statutes and is meant to supplant them.
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plaintiffs should be encouraged to act as private attorneys general in
the process of punishing malicious torts. If one assumes that it is
good to punish those who commit serious civil wrongs, then one
reasonably could argue that a plaintiff who proves that a defendant is
punitively liable, and thus vulnerable under the proposal to a
"Section 2" punitive damages action by the state, has done society a
valuable service, for which the plaintiff should be paid. The problem
then becomes determining fair payment. On the face of things, the
current system's method of paying a plaintiff with a punitive damages
award makes little sense because these awards bear no logical
relation whatsoever to the effort and money plaintiffs expend in a
lawsuit.' In other contexts, courts and legislatures have used the
private-attorney-general doctrine to justify awarding reasonable
attorney's fees to plaintiffs.1' In civil rights cases, courts typically
calculate such fees using the "lodestar" approach, which requires a
court to multiply the reasonable hours counsel spent on a case times
a reasonable hourly rate to determine a base fee award, which the
court may then adjust to take into account the nature of the given
case and counsel's role in it.' Unless strong, demonstrable policy
reasons dictate a different approach, it would seem reasonable, prima
facie, to pay punitive liability plaintiffs for their "legal work"
similarly." Section 1 of the superbifurcation proposal does just
that-it pays plaintiffs their reasonable attorney's fees for performing
the societal service of proving punitive liability.
Once a plaintiff proves punitive liability, its active part in the
punitive damages process would be over. Section 2 provides that the
Attorney General of an enacting state may bring one action to seek
punitive damages in light of all wrongful acts that occurred within his
or her state that were part of the tortious course of conduct that gave
rise to punitive liability and all harms caused by such acts. It also
provides that the trier of fact may award no more in punitive
182. See, e.g., Note, supra note 35, 1903-04 (arguing that punitive awards in excess of
plaintiff litigation costs are windfalls).
183. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) (awarding attorney's fees in federal civil rights
cases); Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1312-15 (Cal. 1977) (awarding attorney's fees
where state constitutional rights are protected to the benefit of a large number of people).
184. See, e.g., Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87 (1990) (discussing calculation of
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433-37 (1983) (same).
185. Of course, a defender of the current regime could argue that punitive awards to
plaintiffs in excess of their legal fees and costs are necessary to ensure that plaintiffs have
sufficient incentive to bring meritorious suits. For a discussion on why there is little
reason to think this is the case, see infra text accompanying notes 216-20.
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damages than the prosecutor requests.1" In such an action for
punitive damages, the defendant would be estopped from denying
any facts necessary to an underlying finding of punitive liability.
Thus, a prosecutor would be able to take maximum advantage of the
information a plaintiff's initial lawsuit provides.
The model statute, however, does not by its terms limit the
factual basis for punitive awards to the facts proven in the course of
reaching findings of punitive liability. For instance, where a
prosecutor proves that the defendant's course of conduct within the
forum state caused harms other than those proven in an underlying
punitive liability action, the prosecutor could seek to persuade the
jury that these extra, "non-Section 1" facts justified increased
punitive damages."' Suppose a plaintiff were to prove that a
company was punitively liable for manufacturing defective breast
implants that caused serious harm to the plaintiff. This showing of
punitive liability could serve as a basis for a punitive damages action
in which the prosecutor could seek an award based on all harms
caused to all persons injured by the defendant's intrastate course of
conduct (i.e., manufacturing and selling defective breast implants).
Allowing the prosecutor to seek punitive damages for all such harms
would help ensure that the jury in a damages action would have as
full a picture as possible of the defendant's behavior and culpability.
At the same time, because the proposal limits prosecutors to seeking
only one award per course of conduct, it would help rationalize the
punishment of mass torts by eliminating the current regime's practice
of permitting an unlimited number of plaintiffs allegedly harmed by a
given course of conduct to seek separate punitive awards against the
defendant in separate lawsuits-a practice that creates obvious
dangers for repetitive, unreasonable punishment.'
186. How the state should determine how big an award to request in a given case is
beyond the scope of this Article.
187. Such a system would place the defendant in a Section 2 punitive damages action
in a situation somewhat similar to that faced by a criminal defendant facing sentencing in
federal court. Cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 1B1.3. At sentencing, the
defendant cannot argue that the jury was wrong in finding guilt; the defendant is stuck
with that "fact." In determining the appropriate sentence, however, the judge considers
not just the offense of conviction, but also acts "that occurred during the commission of
the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to
avoid detection or responsibility for that offense." Id. Likewise, a defendant confronting
an action for punitive damages would be stuck with the facts underlying the finding of
punitive liability, but the prosecutor would be free to prove other damaging facts arising
from the defendant's tortious course of conduct.
188. See infra notes 278-324 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of mass
torts and multiple punishment).
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Section 3 of the model determines where the money goes.
Obviously, if the prosecutor's office lacks the resources to press
punitive damages actions, then superbifurcation cannot work. As a
threshold matter, lack of resources should not be too grave a problem
because punitive damages awards are relatively rare. 9 Still, to help
ensure that adequate resources are available, Section 3 compensates
the prosecutor's office for the expenses it incurs in seeking punitive
damages-much like Section 1 pays plaintiffs for proving punitive
liability.'" Any remainder goes to the general fund-that is, to the
public.
B. Superbifurcation and the Constitution
Of course, to be viable, superbifurcation must be constitutional.
The proposed model raises several constitutional concerns. First, the
proposal allows the state to take advantage of findings of punitive
liability reached in actions between private plaintiffs and defendants,
i.e., it allows a second plaintiff (the state) to club the defendant with a
weapon created by a first plaintiff. This use of offensive, non-mutual
collateral estoppel warrants but clearly survives due process scrutiny.
Second, the proposal puts the state in charge of pursuing punitive
awards and makes the state their beneficiary. This change would
make punitive damages actions and awards subject to scrutiny under
the Excessive Fines..' and Double Jeopardy"9 Clauses. Subjecting
punitive awards to Excessive Fines Clause analysis should not cause
any noteworthy effects as such awards are already subject to a due
process "excessiveness" analysis. In rare instances, however, double
jeopardy concerns might block Section 2 actions for punitive
189. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text (discussing the relative rarity of
punitive awards).
190. At first blush, it might seem ironic that an article that inveighs against plaintiff
conflicts of interest in the punitive damages process should suggest partial payment of
punitive award proceeds to prosecutorial offices. Such payments should not create any
undue conflict of interest, however. Because punitive awards in excess of prosecutorial
costs would go into a state's general fund, prosecutors, unlike plaintiffs' attorneys under
the present system, would not be able to profit financially (directly or indirectly) by
pressing punitive damages claims. As such, money should not cloud prosecutorial
judgment or create any appearance of impropriety.
In any event, such payment of costs is an incidental device designed to alleviate
resource problems prosecutors might encounter in pressing punitive damages claims.
Such problems would not be significant in any event because punitive awards are
relatively rare. Thus, were this financing mechanism to prove in any way problematic, it
could be sliced off the proposal.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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damages.
Allowing the state to take advantage of Section 1 findings of
punitive liability by estopping defendants from denying them in
Section 2 proceedings should be constitutional under the due process
principles set forth in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.193 In that case,
the Supreme Court stated that trial courts should have broad
discretion to apply offensive, non-mutual estoppel except where a
plaintiff seeking to invoke it easily could have joined the earlier
action giving rise to the estoppel or where its application would be
unfair to the defendant.1" The first concern about free-rider plaintiffs
is not an issue because the proposed model does not contemplate
government participation in suits to determine punitive liability. As
for fairness, the Court indicated that application of offensive, non-
mutual collateral estoppel may be unfair to a defendant in at least
three circumstances: (1) where a defendant lacked sufficient
incentive to litigate an issue fully in an earlier proceeding (e.g., if the
defendant were sued for nominal damages in that suit only to face a
far more substantial claim later); (2) where "the judgment relied
upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more
previous judgments in favor of the defendant";19 or (3) "where the
second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities
unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different
result."196
None of these problems seriously undermines the viability of the
proposal. That a finding of punitive liability would give the state an
opportunity to sue for punitive damages should suffice to give
defendants incentive to litigate actions involving a plausible punitive
liability claim. As for the problem of seemingly inconsistent
judgments, the potential for them clearly exists in the mass tort
context. A defendant could win ten Section 1 punitive liability
actions against ten different plaintiffs, lose to the eleventh, and then
find itself vulnerable to a governmental Section 2 action. This
particular concern, which in any event could arise only in exceptional
circumstances, is less bothersome when one remembers that, broadly
speaking, the alternative to superbifurcation is simply to let juries
continue to award punitive damages without prosecutorial "help"
and regardless of whether previous, "inconsistent" judgments
193. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
194. See i& at 331.
195. Id. at 330.
196. 1L at 331.
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involving different plaintiffs exist. It cannot be unfair to defendants
to place an additional barrier between them and punitive awards by
adding the check of prosecutorial review to the process. Lastly, with
regard to the Court's "procedural opportunities" concern, the
proposed model contemplates that a Section 1 finding of punitive
liability would give rise to a Section 2 punitive damages action in the
same state. Therefore, punitive damages actions are unlikely to
create much in the way of extra procedural opportunities for
defendants. There is nothing remotely unfair to defendants about
superbifurcation; therefore, its use of offensive, non-mutual collateral
estoppel should be constitutional.
Punitive damages are not currently subject to Excessive Fines
Clause scrutiny because, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 9' the Supreme Court ruled that this clause "does not
constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the
government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to
receive a share of the damages awarded."'98 Superbifurcation would
both put the state in charge of the prosecution of punitive damages
actions (as opposed to actions for punitive liability, which private
plaintiffs would continue to bring) and also give the state the right to
any proceeds of punishment. The implication of Browning-Ferris is
therefore that punitive awards under the proposed model would
become subject to excessive fines scrutiny. No particularly
interesting conclusions should follow from this result, however,
because, as was mentioned above, the Court has already used the
Due Process Clause to forbid "grossly excessive" punitive awards.'99
The double jeopardy implications of the proposal are more
interesting. In dictum in United States v. Halper, the Supreme Court
remarked that punitive damages, because they result from private
actions between private litigants, are not subject to the Double
Jeopardy Clause.' State involvement obviously would rob punitive
damages of this particular rationale for double jeopardy immunity.
The law concerning when ostensibly civil penalties may trigger a
constitutional jeopardy is, to put the matter mildly, challenging, and
it is filled with nice distinctions."' It is therefore difficult to make
197. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
198. Id. at 264.
199. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1596 (1996).
200. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989). For a fuller discussion of
judicial analyses of how the Double Jeopardy Clause affects punitive damages, see
BOSTON, supra note 36, § 4:16.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147-49 (1996) (discussing
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categorical predictions about how courts would view prosecutor-
initiated punitive damages actions for purposes of double jeopardy.
Without diving too deeply into this rather murky subject, however, it
seems fair to hazard that, under the proposal, where the trier of fact
inflicts a punitive award in part to cause retribution, that award
would trigger the clause's protections.2
Of course, punitive awards are generally supposed to cause both
retribution and deterrence. The presence of a retributive purpose
indicates that state officials would need to consider the double
jeopardy implications of bringing either a criminal or a Section 2
action against a defendant who has been found punitively liable for a
wrong that is arguably both criminal and civil.'
Double jeopardy forbids multiple prosecutions or punishments
of one "offense."' ' Blockburger v. United States provides that, where
"the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires
application of double jeopardy to civil forfeitures and explaining the somewhat counter-
intuitive result that civil forfeiture of a person's house is not "punishment" for purposes
of triggering double jeopardy).
202. In Halper, the Court stated that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely
to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment" that triggers double jeopardy scrutiny.
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. The Court explained that" '[r]etribution and deterrence are not
legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives.'" Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 539 n.20 (1979)). It would be difficult to explain away a given punitive award
without invoking what are, after all, the ostensible purposes of such awards-to punish
and deter. Therefore, under Halper, government-initiated punitive damages actions
ought to be subject to double jeopardy scrutiny.
In Ursery, however, the Court, over Justice Stevens's vigorous dissent, took a very
different approach to deterrence, observing that "we long have held that this purpose may
serve civil as well as criminal goals." Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149. The Court used the
"civil" nature of deterrence to help justify its conclusion that civil forfeitures ostensibly
meant to deter do not trigger double jeopardy. See id. After Ursery, it seems that one
could plausibly argue that, where one can reasonably describe a "punitive" award as
serving only a deterrence function, that award is not a punishment for purposes of double
jeopardy. But see Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997) (referring to
deterrence and retribution as the "two primary objectives of criminal punishment"). At
the very least it seems clear, however, that where one must invoke retribution to provide
a reasonable explanation for an award, that award should trigger double jeopardy
protections.
203. The proposal envisions that state officials would prosecute claims for punitive
damages; county or city officials generally prosecute crimes. Dealing with the double
jeopardy implications of superbifurcation would therefore require some degree of
coordination between state and local officials.
204. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]" (emphasis added)).
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proof of a fact which the other does not."'  In other words,
provisions create different "offenses" where each provision requires
proof of an element that the other does not. One certainly can
imagine cases in which a tort and a crime would amount to the same
offense under this test. For instance, suppose civil liability for
wrongful death requires proof only that one unreasonably caused the
death of another. Ignoring complications such as felony murder for
the moment, murder similarly requires proof of an (unreasonable)
killing as well as some appropriately culpable intent. In this
hypothetical, wrongful death does not require proof of an element
that murder does not require as well-it is a lesser-included "offense"
of murder. A prosecutor would not be able to bring a retributory
Section 2 punitive damages action for this tort after a defendant has
been prosecuted (successfully or not) for murder. 6  A prosecutor
who tried to sue for retributory punitive damages for the tort before
bringing the criminal action could find that the Double Jeopardy
Clause blocked the murder prosecution.
At least three points should be made about the concerns double
jeopardy could pose for superbifurcation. First, such concerns
probably would not arise very often. Presumably, the most likely
torts to give rise to criminal proceedings would be intentional torts,
such as assault and battery. Intentional torts accounted for fewer
than twenty of the 177 punitive damages awards that Professor
Eisenberg's recent study analyzed. 7 By contrast, roughly half of
these awards were inflicted in contract-related tort litigation, a
category one would not intuitively expect to give rise to much in the
way of criminal proceedings.2
Second, the Supreme Court has recently held that deterrence of
wrongdoing may be a "civil" function for purposes of double
jeopardy.20 It is therefore at least plausible that a prosecutor could
205. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342
(1911)).
206. To cite the inevitable example, the Goldmans and Browns would not have been
able to sue O.J. Simpson for punitive damages under the superbifurcation system. In the
Simpson case, former star football player O.J. Simpson was acquitted in a criminal trial of
murdering his wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her companion Ronald Goldman. Their
families sued Simpson in civil court and won a multi-million dollar verdict in which he was
found liable for the deaths of both. See, e.g., B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Jury Decides
Simpson Must Pay $25 Million Punitive Award, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at Al
(discussing Simpson civil verdict).
207. See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 635.
208. See id.
209. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2149 (1996). But see Kansas v.
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bring a Section 2 action solely to inflict a deterrence award without
triggering double jeopardy.
Third, it is not so obvious why the state ought to be able to use a
punitive action and a criminal action to cause retribution twice.
Suppose a defendant has committed a tort that is also a crime.
Suppose also that no criminal prosecution has commenced before a
jury finds the defendant punitively liable in a Section 1 action. The
state has a choice: to bring a criminal action or a civil one for
punitive damages. Whichever one is brought first blocks the second.
Suppose a prosecutor chooses to bring a criminal action and the
defendant is found guilty and sentenced. The only reason the state
could have for then seeking a punitive award against that defendant
would be if the court imposed a criminal sentence that was too light
to punish properly.
The criminal system, however, should be designed to inflict
optimal punishment without the fortuitous help of the civil system. If
crimes are not punished harshly enough, then the legislature should
write stricter sentences into law. Punitive damages, by contrast,
should be most appropriate where a defendant's conduct, though not
subject to criminal punishment (for whatever reason), is nonetheless
outrageous enough to warrant some sort of retribution and
deterrence."' In such instances, because (by hypothesis) criminal
punishment is not contemplated, double jeopardy poses no concern.
Suppose, however, the defendant wins an acquittal in the
criminal action. In such an instance, a state official might rationally
believe that, although the defendant evaded punishment under the
reasonable doubt standard applicable in criminal cases, enough
evidence existed to prove liability under the more relaxed standards
of proof applicable in civil proceedings for punitive damages. If such
proof sufficient for civil purposes indeed existed, then one plausibly
could argue that it would be a good thing to force that person to pay
punitive damages. The loss of this power to seek punitive damages
after "improper" acquittal-one might refer to it as the "O.J.
Simpson power"-would be a cost of superbifurcation. The example
of Mr. Simpson notwithstanding, however, it seems likely that such
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,2082 (1997) (characterizing deterrence as a primary objective
of criminal punishment).
210. Notably, this suggestion squares fairly well with the private-attorney-general
rationale for punitive damages. That rationale generally assumes that punitive damages
are a good idea because the state is too busy or ignorant to punish everyone who deserves
it. Where, however, the state has brought a criminal action against a defendant, the need
for a private attorney general is obviously less.
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situations would arise only rarely."
To summarize constitutional concerns: Superbifurcation's use of
offensive, non-mutual collateral estoppel passes due process muster.
Under the proposal, punitive awards would trigger Excessive Fines
Clause scrutiny, but no interesting consequences follow because due
process already strikes punitive awards that are "grossly excessive."
The proposal probably also would cause punitive damages to trigger
the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which, in rare cases,
would force the state to choose between bringing a Section 2 punitive
damages or a criminal action against a defendant found punitively
liable.
C. The Effects of Superbifurcation on the Power of Punitive
Damages to Punish and Deter
This Article is aggressively agnostic on the subject of whether
punitive damages do good in the world. Its larger point is that,
regardless of whether punitive damages actually make any sense as a
device to punish and deter, they can be made fairer by
superbifurcation. Because, however, this Article proposes a
"reform" rather than the abolition of punitive damages, it has an
obligation to demonstrate that its proposal would preserve-to some
acceptable degree-whatever deterrence and punishment powers the
present system may possess. A rough and necessarily speculative
analysis of the problem indicates that the proposal would do so. It is
not simply a sneaky way to do away with punitive damages.
The power of the present system to serve its ostensible purposes
depends on its ability to make defendants part with money they could
otherwise keep under a purely compensatory tort system. Payment
of extra-compensatory amounts causes retribution by making the
defendant endure the pain of paying money to the plaintiff. It deters
future wrongdoing on the theory that the defendant and other
potential tortfeasors will fear for their wallets and refrain from
211. One last point: Halper seems to leave open the possibility that states could
fashion combined proceedings to seek both criminal and civil penalties, which would
eliminate double jeopardy concerns. In discussing why its ruling that civil penalties under
the False Claims Act may trigger double jeopardy was not going to disrupt government
efforts to combat fraud, the Court stated, "[n]or does the decision prevent the
Government from seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full range of
statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding." United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435,450 (1989). Thus, it seems possible that, where a defendant has not
been subject to a jeopardy prior to a finding of Section 1 punitive liability, the state may
be able to pursue both criminal punishment and punitive damages in one subsequent
proceeding.
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committing malicious torts. The present system causes defendants to
pay this money in two ways: (1) it authorizes judgments for punitive
awards; and (2) by doing so, it gives plaintiffs the power to bargain
for higher settlements in cases that do not go to trial. Any reform
that reduces the frequency and size of punitive awards or drives down
the settlement value of punitive claims would tend to reduce (for
good or ill) their impact on defendants.
Superbifurcation undoubtedly would affect all three in ways that
are difficult to predict but not obviously good or bad. As a general
matter, however, one can safely speculate that the proposal would
not destroy punitive damages as an institution. It would create
sufficient incentives for both plaintiffs and prosecutors to do their
parts in bringing suit against malicious tortfeasors; juries would
continue to use punitive awards on occasion to club malicious
wrongdoers-though probably not at precisely the same rate or with
the same harshness as under the present system. As for the
proposal's effects on the settlement process, it could strengthen
incentives for parties to settle lawsuits. To the extent it is better to
settle than to litigate, this is a very good thing. By largely the same
token, however, the proposal probably also would exert a measure of
downward pressure on settlement amounts. Still, just as it is not clear
how frequent and large punitive awards should be to serve society
best, so it is also not obvious how much of a punitive premium
plaintiffs ought to be able to extract in the settlement process. Thus,
to return to one of this Article's basic themes, our ignorance sets us
free to experiment.
1. Effects on the Frequency of Punitive Awards
The proposed model would do nothing to change the substantive
law of punitive damages, i.e., it would not make them harder to win
at trial by changing the "elements" of punitive liability. It could
nonetheless affect the rate of punitive awards by decreasing the
number of actions for punitive damages brought in the first place-a
suit that is not begun cannot be won. Most notably in this regard: (1)
prosecutors could reduce the rate by failing to bring Section 2
punitive damages actions based on underlying Section I findings of
punitive liability; (2) private plaintiffs, deprived of the chance to win
punitive damages per se, might decide that seeking to prove Section 1
punitive liability just to win fees under the superbifurcation system is
not worth the trouble; and (3) defendants might avoid findings of
Section 1 liability, and thus vulnerability to state-initiated Section 2
actions, by buying off plaintiffs with inflated settlements that enable
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defendants to avoid facing the punitive damages music. None of
these worries is sufficient justification to refuse to try the
superbifurcation experiment a priori.
a. Prosecutorial Willingness and Ability to Sue for Punitive
Damages
Before a prosecutor can bring an action, several conditions must
be satisfied. The prosecutor must have the resources to sue-an
overwhelmed office cannot seek to punish all who may deserve it.
The prosecutor must know some of the facts underlying the potential
case-one cannot prosecute the completely unknown. The proposed
model is structured to ensure that prosecutors have sufficient
resources and information to bring punitive damages actions.
Another precondition is that the prosecutor must believe that the
defendant's conduct warrants punishment. Superbifurcation cannot
give prosecutors the will to sue for punitive damages, but then, it
should not try to do so in any event. One of the chief advantages of
the proposal is that it contemplates that defendants would have to
face punitive damages actions only in those cases in which state
officials-without personal financial interests in punishment-
determine that such actions are appropriate.
Lack of resources should not interfere with states' ability to
bring actions for punitive damages. Again, punitive awards are quite
rare. Returning to Professor Eisenberg's recent study of punitive
awards in state courts of general jurisdiction in forty-five of the
seventy-five most populous counties in the country, juries in thirteen
of these counties awarded no punitive awards from July 1, 1991, to
June 30, 1992; in twenty-seven counties, juries made ten or fewer
punitive awards."2 Juries imposed more than ten punitive awards in
just five very large counties: (1) Los Angeles County, California,
thirty-six awards; (2) San Francisco County, California, seventeen
awards; (3) Fulton County, Georgia, sixteen awards; (4) Dallas
County, Texas, twenty-nine awards; and (5) Harris County, Texas,
forty-four awards."3 These numbers probably overstate the number
of punitive actions prosecutors actually would need to try under the
proposal, however, because one would expect that many defendants
found punitively liable would rather settle than fight with the state
over damages. Furthermore, trying punitive damages actions should
not prove too taxing as a general matter because the proposal
212. See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 644-45.
213. See id.
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envisions that private plaintiffs would do the bulk of the necessary
legal heavy lifting by way of proving punitive liability. Lastly, Section
3 of the proposal should allay any lingering resource concerns
because it uses punitive awards themselves to pay for the costs
prosecutors' offices would incur in bringing punitive damages actions.
Superbifurcation would not overwhelm states with a sea of suits.
214
As for the knowledge problem, the beauty of the proposal is that
it creates a structure in which private plaintiffs, motivated by desires
for compensation and attendant attorney's fees, bring Section 1
actions that provide state officials with the facts sufficient to bring
subsequent Section 2 actions for punitive damages. Indeed, one of
the proposal's chief goals is to allow the state to obtain the benefits of
plaintiff informational advantages while restructuring the process to
avoid the effects of plaintiff conflicts of interest.
Other than in rare cases in which double jeopardy presents a
concern, and assuming prosecutors have sufficient resources and
knowledge, the only other barrier to a Section 2 punitive damages
action would be if the prosecutor in charge did not want to bring such
an action. For instance, a prosecutor might conclude that, although a
defendant's conduct merited punitive liability, the underlying
compensatory award and attendant Section 1 attorney's fees were
sufficient to satisfy punishment and deterrence concerns. As a
threshold matter, one might note that prosecutors as a group are not
known for being soft-minded with regard to punishment; there is no
reason to presume that they would, as a general matter, ignore clearly
meritorious claims for punitive damages. In any event, as is discussed
in more detail below, it is a good thing for persons experienced in law
enforcement and lacking personal financial conflicts of interest to
exercise judgment as to when the great machinery of state should be
used to inflict pain on defendants.2"5 Prima facie, if prosecutors have
the resources and knowledge necessary to bring claims for punitive
damages as well as a good faith, vigorous interest in the enforcement
of the law, then any decreases in punitive awards caused by
214. For largely the same reasons, the proposal would not add greatly to judicial
workloads.
215. This is not to suggest that state officials' decisions to seek (or not to seek)
punitive damages would always be made with pure heart. Political pressures and
ambitions would no doubt unduly affect some decisions. That politics would taint some
state decisions, however, cannot justify the present system in which private plaintiffs'
economic interests are virtually guaranteed to taint all such decisions. See infra text
accompanying notes 232-54 (expanding on the need for relatively "conflict-free"
prosecution as part of the punishment process).
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prosecutorial refusals to seek them should, at least as a general
matter, make the punitive damages system better, not weaker.
b. Plaintiffs' Willingness to Press Claims of Punitive Liability
Of course, superbifurcation cannot work unless private plaintiffs
continue to do their part by pursuing claims for Section 1 punitive
liability. They should do so if the benefits of bringing such claims
justify the costs. Costs should not be a problem because it typically
should be relatively cheap to add a claim for punitive liability on top
of an underlying compensatory claim. The key prerequisite to
proving punitive liability is proving the defendant's "malice"-some
level of culpable intent. Malice is not an empirically discoverable
fact about a defendant's brain (at least not yet), but rather a
characterization of conduct. To press an underlying compensatory
claim, the plaintiff generally would be interested in learning as much
as practically possible about this conduct in any event.2 1 Thus, in the
run of cases, seeking to prove punitive liability (i.e., characterizing
the defendant's course of conduct as "malicious" or "outrageous")
should not add greatly to the plaintiff's otherwise existent
informational needs. Therefore, it generally should be cheap for
plaintiffs to press claims for punitive liability in addition to claims for
compensation.
However, while superbifurcation does not increase the costs of
proving malicious conduct, it does somewhat reduce plaintiff
incentives to do so because, in most (but by no means necessarily all)
cases in which a jury awards punitive damages, one would usually
expect punitive awards to exceed fees. Furthermore, the proposed
model obviously would deprive plaintiffs and their attorneys of the
hope of winning a punitive damages jackpot-an exceptionally large,
multi-million dollar punitive award.
Sufficient incentives should remain, however, to ensure that
plaintiffs would bring most meritorious claims. For one thing, juries
very rarely grant substantial punitive awards in the absence of a
substantial compensatory award.217 It presumably would follow that,
in almost all cases in which a plaintiff reasonably could expect to
216. Even when some level of malicious intent is not technically an element of the tort
forming the basis for a compensatory award, e.g., the tort sounds in negligence, it seems
reasonable to assume that plaintiffs should remain very interested in finding evidence of
defendant skullduggery.
217. Professor Eisenberg reports that "[c]ases with low or zero compensatory awards
and substantial punitive awards comprise approximately 2 percent of the punitive
awards." Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 639.
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prove punitive liability (whether under the current system or the
proposal), that plaintiff should expect to win a sizable compensatory
award as well. Even if one removes the enticement of punitive
damages or attorney's fees from the picture, such a plaintiff would
have a large incentive to sue to obtain compensation. Of course, by
giving this plaintiff the chance to win reasonable attorney's fees at
low cost, the superbifurcation proposal could only increase this
incentive.
Furthermore, it is important to remember the incentives the
settlement process would provide. Although plaintiffs would not be
able to win punitive damages under superbifurcation, their actions
would lay the necessary groundwork for prosecutorial punitive
damages actions. It obviously would be in the best interests of
defendants to avoid findings of punitive liability due to this gate-
opening effect; they would therefore pay a premium in the settlement
process to avoid them.2"9 The prospect of winning substantial
compensation at trial with reasonable attorney's fees paid or else
negotiating a settlement inflated by a punitive premium should
provide sufficient litigation incentives in the run of cases.
Exceptions would exist, of course. A case might be so expensive
218. The chance to win statutory fees also would increase attorney incentives to take
such cases. It is important to be clear on why this is so. One can imagine instances in
which the promise of a contingent cut of a compensatory claim looks far more attractive
than winning a judge's notion of an appropriate lodestar-based fee. Therefore, if the
proposal were to require attorneys to accept statutory fees in lieu of contingency fees, it
could create perverse incentives for attorneys to refrain from bringing claims for punitive
liability.
The proposal does not impose such a requirement, however. Like 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
it grants statutory fees to the victorious plaintiff, not the attorney. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1994). How a plaintiff actually pays an attorney would simply be a function of their
contract, which could call for a contingency fee. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 89-
90 (1990) (explaining that contingency fee contracts requiring a civil rights plaintiff to pay
attorney's fees greater than a statutory fee award are enforceable under § 1988). Given
the incentives involved, one could expect that attorneys plying their trade in
superbifurcation jurisdictions would structure their contracts to ensure that proving
punitive liability and winning statutory fees would increase rather than decrease their
financial rewards.
219. It bears noting that a different analysis would apply in the mass tort context after
an initial finding of punitive liability in a given forum. Defendants would have a very
strong interest in avoiding the first Section 1 finding of punitive liability in any given
superbifurcation state, as that finding would make the defendant vulnerable in that forum
to a state-brought Section 2 action. Thus, plaintiffs settling before any such finding
should be able to extract an accordingly high premium. After the defendant suffers its
first Section 1 loss in a state, however, it would have much less to fear from any
subsequent private suit. Therefore, plaintiffs settling after such a finding would be able to
extract little if any punitive premium in the settlement process.
[Vol. 76
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
to pursue that the promise of a substantial compensatory award by
itself would not provide sufficient incentive to sue. If the plaintiff
were 100% certain of proving punitive liability, then the certainty of
winning fees would eliminate this concern about expense. More
realistically, however, the plaintiff would not be certain of proving
punitive liability, and the expected value of the fee award would have
to be discounted accordingly. It is therefore certainly possible that,
in a given case, the combined expected value of a compensatory
award and fees might still be insufficient to outweigh expected
expenses. In such an instance, the chance to win punitive damages,
which are generally greater than attorney's fees, might tip the
balance. By depriving plaintiffs of this chance, the proposal could
therefore cause some plaintiffs to refrain from suing in instances in
which: (1) a case seems very expensive to litigate even relative to the
prospect of a substantial compensatory award, and (2) the plaintiff
doubts her ability to prove punitive liability, but (3) nonetheless
thinks that, were a jury to award punitive damages, they would
exceed reasonable (but by hypothesis, quite high) attorney's fees. It
is not obvious whether the world would be made a much worse place
by reducing incentives to litigate this subset of potential suits.
c. Effects on Incentives to Settle
The proposal also could alter the rate at which juries inflict
punitive awards by increasing the likelihood that parties will settle.
Settlement occurs where both plaintiff and defendant believe they
will gain more by settling than by going to trial and where neither
side thinks that it can cost-effectively extract more concessions from
the other in further negotiations. Both sides to a dispute must
determine a settlement value for the plaintiffs claims. To determine
this value under the present system, the plaintiff must first determine
the sum of the expected outcomes for its compensatory and punitive
claims, i.e., the expected size of these awards multiplied by the
plaintiff's notion of how likely a jury would be to award them. From
this amount, the plaintiff must subtract the expected forward-going
transactional costs required to take the case to trial rather than settle,
i.e., how much it will cost to acquire the compensatory and punitive
awards. This difference is the plaintiff's minimum price for
settlement. If the defendant offers more than this amount, then the
plaintiff should settle-at least once the plaintiff thinks no more
220. This supposition is less likely to be true in the sort of cases under discussion
because they are, by hypothesis, expensive cases to pursue.
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money can be negotiated out of the defendant. Likewise, the
defendant must gauge the maximum price it is willing to pay the
plaintiff to avoid trial. This amount is the defendant's notion of the
sum of the expected outcomes for the compensatory and punitive
claims plus the defendant's expected trial costs. If the plaintiff offers
to settle for less than this amount, then the defendant should settle-
subject, of course, to the same negotiation proviso.
In superbifurcation settlement negotiations, by contrast, the
plaintiff's settlement value would be based on the expected
compensatory outcome plus the expected outcome for its claim for
sunk attorney's fees (i.e., fees already incurred times the likelihood of
proving punitive liability). The defendant's settlement value,
however, would be based on its notion of the expected outcomes for
the plaintiff's compensatory claim, the plaintiff's fee claim, the
defendant's future transactional costs, and the state's claim for
punitive damages. The settling defendant would be paying for (and
receiving) more than the plaintiff would be getting.
This result should make it somewhat more likely, in any given
case, for the defendant to offer a settlement amount greater than the
minimum value the plaintiff has placed on its claims, i.e., the proposal
encourages settlement by expanding the financial "space" in which
settlement rationally can occur.21 How effective this incentive would
prove in causing settlement would depend in part on the parties'
respective assessments of the expected outcomes for the plaintiff's
various claims. It seems reasonable to suppose that, in the bulk of
cases, differing valuations of the compensatory claims at issue would
tend to drive negotiations because punitive awards are rare enough
that the prospect of winning them should not significantly affect most
settlement discussions. Some cases, however, would settle that would
not have done so under the present system.'
221. Cf. Note, supra note 35, at 1914 (noting the problem that any system that splits
punitive awards between the plaintiff and the state encourages plaintiffs and defendants
to reach settlements allowing the parties to split the state's share of the award).
222. Allocation statutes should have the same effect for similar reasons. Suppose a
state permits successful punitive damages plaintiffs to keep one-half of their awards while
the rest flows into state coffers. Ignore compensatory awards, transaction costs, and the
time value of money and suppose also that the plaintiff in a punitive damages case
believes that the expected outcome for its punitive claim is $10 million. The plaintiff's
minimum settlement value is $5 million, due to allocation. Suppose the defendant
believes the expected outcome for the punitive claim is $6 million. Without the 50%
allocation statute in place, settlement would be impossible-the plaintiff would demand
$4 million more than the defendant would pay. Under the hypothetical 50% allocation
statute, however, the plaintiff and defendant should, barring strategic problems, settle the
claim for between $5 million and $6 million. Thus, by permitting plaintiffs to recover only
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2. Effects of Superbifurcation on the Amounts Defendants Must Pay
In addition to affecting the rates at which juries inflict punitive
awards, the proposal also would affect the power of punitive damages
to punish and deter by affecting both the size of awards where
punitive claims proceed to trial and by affecting the amounts for
which defendants settle claims to avoid trial. Any concerns in this
regard are not serious enough to justify rejection of the
superbifurcation experiment without first trying it.
It is difficult to gauge how public prosecution of punitive
damages would affect the size of awards. They might well lessen
them. One of the problems with the current punitive damages system
is that it permits private plaintiffs and their attorneys to argue how
harshly defendants should be punished.m The plaintiffs' interest in
such situations is to serve their pocketbooks-not the public good.
Plaintiffs' lawyers have a powerful incentive to argue for as high a
punitive award as they can seek with a straight face. 4 It is
reasonable to speculate that permitting plaintiffs' lawyers to make
their self-interested arguments to juries tends to inflate awards
(although it is, of course, theoretically possible that juries completely
see through such self-interest and discount their awards accordingly).
In any event, prosecutors would not face this same powerful financial
conflict of interest. Lacking this particular pressure to argue for
higher awards, prosecutors probably would tend, as a group, to
request lower awards. Smaller requests could lead to smaller
awards, especially because, under the proposed model, juries would
not be able to award more in damages than requested by prosecutors.
On the other hand, adding prosecutors to the process may
a fraction of punitive awards while leaving defendants liable for the whole amount (i.e.,
by "decoupling" plaintiff recovery and defendant payment), allocation increases the
likelihood that plaintiffs and defendants will price claims in ways that allow settlement.
Superbifurcation would operate similarly.
223. See infra text accompanying notes 227-54 (discussing problems of plaintiff
windfalls and conflicts of interest).
224. For instance, ABC ran an expos6 on PrimeTime Live in 1992 in which it charged
that Food Lion, Inc., a supermarket chain, sold expired meat. Food Lion sued because, in
the course of their research, ABC employees had lied to get jobs with Food Lion and
surreptitiously filmed their work with cameras hidden in their wigs. Food Lion's lawyer
requested $52 million to $1.9 billion in punitive damages. The jury deliberated six days
before deciding on $5.5 million. See Howard Kurtz & Sue Ann Pressley, Jury Finds
Against ABC for $5.5 Million, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1997, at Al.
225. Of course, one can imagine situations in which state officials would seek
inordinately high damages to take credit for enriching states' coffers or punishing
unpopular defendants in order to fuel political ambitions. State officials who give in to
such temptations might request even larger punitive awards than plaintiffs motivated by
personal financial interests.
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encourage juries in some cases to inflict larger awards by removing
the windfall problem. Courts instruct juries to make plaintiffs whole
by awarding compensatory damages and to punish defendants with
punitive damages which, until the advent of allocation statutes in
some states, went wholly to the compensated plaintiff. This windfall
problem may exert a downward pressure on punitive awards under
the current system. A jury might well wonder why it should transfer
wealth to a plaintiff whom it has just made whole, as it were, and the
jury might therefore inflict a smaller award than it would in the
absence of this windfall problem. If, however, it is clear that the
punitive award goes to the state rather than to a compensated
plaintiff, then this downward pressure disappears and awards may go
up.
In any event, given that the vast majority of civil cases settle
(and the proposed model would somewhat increase settlement
incentives), the effects of superbifurcation on the size of settlements
might have more important consequences for the world than its
effects on actual punitive awards. Under the present system,
plaintiffs can use plausible punitive damages claims to drive up the
price of settlements. As was alluded to above in the discussion on
plaintiff incentives to bring Section 1 actions, plaintiffs would not lose
all of this leverage under the proposed model because defendants
would have a strong interest in avoiding findings of punitive liability
that the state could use as the basis for subsequent Section 2 damages
actions and would pay premiums above compensation in the
settlement process to avoid them.
Under the proposal, the size of the punitive premium a
defendant would pay in a given case depends on, among other things:
(1) how strong a possibility the defendant perceives it faces of being
forced to pay attorney's fees to the plaintiff and a punitive award to
the state in the absence of settlement; and (2) how large the
defendant thinks these sums would be. Superbifurcation may, as a
general matter, reduce the size and frequency of punitive awards for
the reasons discussed (although removal of the windfall problem may
tend actually to increase award amounts). Any downward pressure
on punitive awards in turn would reduce the value of punitive claims
as bargaining chips in the settlement process.
Furthermore, plaintiffs generally would not be able to capture
the settlement value of potential punitive awards under
superbifurcation to the degree they can under the present system.
Again, settlement figures lie between the minimum amount of money
a plaintiff will take and the maximum amount a defendant will pay to
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avoid or end a lawsuit. Suppose that, under the present system, a
plaintiff at settlement negotiations believes that a jury would be 50%
likely to award her $400,000 in compensatory damages and would be
10% likely to grant punitive damages of $5 million. During the
settlement negotiations, the expected outcome (the expected award
times the perceived likelihood of winning it) for the compensatory
claim is $200,000; the expected outcome for the punitive claim is
$500,000. The plaintiff already has incurred $50,000 in litigation
expenses and expects to incur $100,000 more in trying her case to a
jury. The plaintiff's minimum settlement value is $600,000-the sum
of the expected compensatory and punitive outcomes minus future
transaction costs. A superbifurcated system would allow the plaintiff
who successfully proves punitive liability to win only a compensatory
award plus reasonable attorney's fees. Keeping her expectations
concerning the value of her claims constant, under the proposed
model, the plaintiff's minimum settlement value becomes the sum of
the expected outcome for the compensatory award ($200,000) plus
the expected outcome with regard to winning the sunk attorney's fees
by proving punitive liability ($50,000 times 10%, or $5,000). The
plaintiff rationally should prefer settlement to trial for all settlement
offers greater than $205,000, as opposed to $600,000 under the
present system.
Superbifurcation thus generally would have the effect of
reducing the minimum price plaintiffs would charge defendants to
avoid trials. Defendants, of course, would be perfectly aware of this
result and would therefore seek lower settlement figures. In any
given case, however, the plaintiff also would know that the defendant
rationally should prefer to settle for any amount less than the
defendant expects it would have to pay by trying the plaintiff's
Section 1 action and perhaps then facing a state-brought Section 2
action. In short, superbifurcation might not do much to reduce the
maximum price a defendant rationally should pay to avoid trial even
while it reduces the minimum rational price a plaintiff should charge.
The amount for which the parties settle between these two figures is
a product of their negotiating skill and knowledge of each other.
Superbifurcation would have some tendency to reduce settlement
figures, however, because it makes it possible for parties to reach
settlements that would be irrationally low for plaintiffs under the
present system. Thus, the proposal would tend to reduce the punitive
premium that plaintiffs extract from defendants in the settlement
process.
In sum, for all the reasons given above, the proposed model
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likely would reduce the rate at which juries inflict punitive awards,
increase the settlement rate of lawsuits with serious punitive claims,
and exert downward pressure on the size of punitive awards and
settlements. As has been repeatedly stressed, however, no stable
frame of reference exists for determining the "optimal" size of
punitive awards with any precision.2 The same is true for
settlements of punitive claims, because it is not clear how much
plaintiffs should extract from defendants as punitive premiums in the
settlement process to make the world the best it can be. It therefore
follows that there is no obvious reason to prefer the rate and size of
punitive awards and settlements generated under the present system
to those that would be generated under the proposal.
Broadly speaking, however, the most important point to take
from this analysis is that adoption of superbifurcation generally
would leave plaintiffs with sufficient incentives to pursue meritorious
claims for punitive liability and also would ensure that prosecutors
would have the resources and information-they would have to
provide the will themselves-to seek punitive damages where
appropriate. Thus, the proposal is not a backhanded way to destroy
the institution of punitive damages.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF SUPERBIFURCATION
Part III presented the negative case for superbifurcation, arguing
that adoption of this proposal would not destroy any demonstrable
advantages the present system enjoys while at the same time it would
preserve the core power of that system to hurt, on appropriate
occasions, those who commit malicious torts. Part IV takes a more
affirmative approach, discussing the procedural fairness advantages
of superbifurcation-notably: (1) it gets rid of the taint that the
potential for windfalls and attendant conflicts of interest bring to
punishment under the present system; (2) it checks the troublingly
vast and relatively uncontrolled power most juries now have to inflict
punitive awards; and (3) it lessens the risk of repetitive punishment in
the context of mass torts.
A. Eliminating Money as a Motive for Punishment
1. Ending Windfalls
Perhaps the most obvious drawback of the current punitive
226. See supra text accompanying notes 164-75.
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damages regime, notwithstanding the advent of allocation statutes, is
the windfalls that it gives plaintiffs and their lawyers. Courts instruct
juries to award compensatory damages to make plaintiffs whole-to
cure plaintiffs of the harms caused by defendant misconduct. If a tort
is outrageous enough to merit punitive liability, then, to hurt the
defendant, a jury may award punitive damages to the plaintiff on top
of the compensatory award. Thus, as a formal legal matter at any
rate, a plaintiff who wins punitive damages has won the tort lottery-
he or she is in better shape in the eyes of the law than if the
defendant had never committed the wrong. The government ought
to have some demonstrable policy reason for compelling wrongdoers
to put such extra-compensatory "windfalls" in plaintiffs' pockets
rather than state coffers.
One possible justification is that granting punitive awards to
plaintiffs encourages them to act as private .attorneys general and
thus ensures that society's retributive and deterrence goals are better
served than if punishment functions were left solely to the state. The
private-attorney-general rationale depends for its force, however, on
the assumption that the enforcement role plaintiffs perform under
the present system would go undone if plaintiffs could no longer win
the punitive jackpot. As was discussed above, there is little reason to
think that the superbifurcation model, which awards successful
plaintiffs their reasonable attorney's fees, would not provide
sufficient incentive as a general matter for plaintiffs to seek to prove
punitive liability in cases warranting it, nor to think that state officials
would fail to discharge properly their duties to bring subsequent
punitive damages actions.'7 If this is the case, then there is also little
reason to think that state actions would not serve the broad
retributive and deterrent functions of punitive damages roughly as
well as private actions could. If one grants all this, then the private-
attorney-general theory does not justify choosing the present system
over superbifurcation.
Another possible justification for "windfalls," however, is that
they actually serve worthwhile compensatory functions. One need
not accept the premise that the current compensatory regime is
sufficient to make plaintiffs whole. Most obviously, compensatory
awards typically do not grant plaintiffs their attorney's fees. This
practice is, in a sense, an exception to the more general rule that the
plaintiff may win compensation for all harms proximately caused by
defendant misconduct. It should be reasonably foreseeable to a
227. See supra text accompanying notes 212-20.
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tortfeasor that the person he or she harms may sue for recompense
and incur attorney's fees along the way. Thus, that portion of a
punitive award that makes up for the absence of attorney's fees is not
a windfall at all.m
Moreover, some scholars have argued that compensatory
damages do not, as a general matter, sufficiently compensate
plaintiffs for emotional and other intangible losses that are quite real
but non-quantifiable. 9 Punitive damages may thus be defended as a
means to fill the serious gaps left by an inadequate compensatory
regime.
The question remains, however, whether awarding plaintiffs
punitive damages is the best available means to finish the
compensatory job. Again, according to most courts, the ostensible
purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter. The penalty a
jury concludes is the appropriate amount to accomplish these tasks
may be far removed from the amount the jury would choose if its
goal were to grant full compensation-however broadly construed.
The possibility always exists that a jury will award the plaintiff a
massive windfall.
The superbifurcation model avoids this danger by addressing the
problem of inadequate compensation directly by forcing defendants
to pay the reasonable attorney's fees of those whom they maliciously
injure. Admittedly, it does not address the objection that the present
compensatory regime does not allow sufficient recovery for
emotional or other intangible losses. Even, however, if one grants
the premise that compensatory damages as presently conceived are
not sufficiently generous to plaintiffs, the solution to this problem
should be to change our approach to compensatory awards, not to
continue to use a punitive damages regime because it has the
"byproduct"''  of ensuring full compensation. It follows that the
hidden compensatory effects of the current punitive damages regime
do not justify preferring it over superbifurcation.
The proposed model both provides a reasonable amount of
incentive for private attorneys general and also forthrightly serves
the primary compensatory functions of the current punitive damages
system. By doing so, it robs the present system of its justification for
228. For a similar analysis, see Note, supra note 35, at 1903-04, and Owen, supra note
3, at 378-79.
229. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 3, at 379.
230. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 11 (suggesting that "compensating some plaintiffs for
otherwise uncompensable losses or attorneys' fees may be viewed, not as justification for,
but as a byproduct of punitive damages").
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granting plaintiffs the chance to play the tort lottery. In short,
superbifurcation provides a logical means to do away with
windfalls.21
2. Getting Rid of the Financially Interested Private Prosecutor
Windfalls are worse than mere unjustified transfers of wealth to
plaintiffs. They also cause the desire for money to taint the process
for determining punishment of malicious torts. Punitive damages
plaintiffs and their attorneys are financially interested in maximum
punishment-the more the jury hurts the defendant, the better for
the plaintiff. One therefore would expect plaintiffs to follow their
rational economic self-interest and to request as much in the way of
punitive damages from juries as they feel they colorably can. A
thought experiment: An attorney says to her client, "I've heard tell
of juries sometimes awarding many millions in punitive damages for
your sort of injury caused by this huge, unfeeling, multi-national
corporation. I think, however, that to properly deter and punish the
defendant in this case will require an award of only $100,000, and
that's what I'll ask for." This imaginary attorney would soon be
looking for new imaginary clients. Because no one actually knows
how large punitive awards should be, only the plaintiff's attorney's
imagination limits the size of her award request. Indeed, a plaintiff's
attorney who asks for anything less than the maximum request she
thinks might tend to increase the jury's award may be committing
malpractice and is certainly not zealously pursuing her client's
interests.
Unless proponents of the present system can demonstrate clear
policy advantages for preserving the practice of permitting plaintiffs
to argue how harshly to punish defendants, it should be abandoned
for at least two reasons. First, as has been mentioned earlier, it is
reasonable to assume (though terribly difficult to prove) that this
practice may, in fact, improperly influence juries, in the sense that
they may impose different awards than they would if ostensibly
conflict-free prosecutors drove the system. 2 Second, on a less
speculative and more emphatic note, permitting plaintiffs with a
financial interest in maximum punishment to argue for and collect
231. A large caveat: The proposal would not prevent plaintiffs from extracting
punitive premiums from defendants in the settlement process; superbifurcation does not
eliminate "settlement windfalls." However, it would, as a general matter, probably tend
to reduce them. See supra note 219 and discussion of settlements in text following note
225.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 223-25.
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punitive damages smells rotten. Again, unnecessarily injecting
plaintiff financial incentives into the punishment process undermines
the law's legitimacy.
Of course, this Article is by no means the first to suggest that the
current punitive damages regime is flawed because it permits
financially motivated parties to argue how harshly defendants should
be punished. As Professor Clarence Morris observed in his seminal
1931 article, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases:
Punitive damages go to the private purse of an individual.
A person who is to profit by the punishment of another is
likely to prefer severe punishment to admonition that will
best serve social ends, and the two are not necessarily
synonymous. The plaintiff's position is analogous to that of
the prosecuting attorney whose pay is determined by the
number of convictions he is able to secure. Past experience
seems to indicate that such prosecutors have a tendency to
be more interested in sending people to the penitentiary
than in punishing the guilty. The plaintiff in a punitive
damage case not only profits by securing the admonition of
the defendant; he profits more by heavy punishment than by
light. So it would not be surprising if plaintiffs in punitive
damage cases attempted to introduce evidence which might
influence juries to give high awards and which has little or
no bearing on the proper admonition of defendants.'
But on the very next page of his article, Professor Morris
dispensed with this argument by turning to that rhetorical device that
so often turns up in discussions of punitive damages (including this
one, of course)-the burden of proof:
But at best this criticism is based on hypothesis, and its
value depends on the facts. We need to know whether
defendants in punitive damage cases are being held for
inadvisedly large sums; whether plaintiffs are attempting to
prejudice juries for the purpose of getting high punitive
damage awards; whether judges are unable to frustrate such
attempts; whether juries can see through such attempts and
avoid being influenced by them. If the facts support this
criticism, the punitive damage device can only be regarded
as a poor tool which must be abandoned or improved.
Whoever has the burden of proof in this context loses." s
233. Morris, supra note 70, at 1178.
234. Id. at 1179.
235. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 27, at 1059 (making this observation in the context of
the evaluation of the deterrence effects of products liability punitive awards).
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Because no usefully exact, consensus framework exists for
determining the proper amounts of punitive awards," simple factual
inquiry cannot genuinely settle whether, as a general matter, juries
are awarding "inadvisedly large sums." Furthermore, given the lack
of a stable framework for analysis and comparison, it is difficult to
imagine how one could examine rigorously whether juries are able to
"see through" and "avoid being influenced by" plaintiffs' quite
natural attempts to talk them into imposing inflated punitive awards.
Notwithstanding this layer of uncertainty, examination of the
role of the prosecutor in the enforcement of the criminal law-the
other and primary arena for state punishment-highlights the
dangers of permitting plaintiffs with intense conflicts of interest to act
as prosecutors. Private prosecution plays a very small role in the
modem-day punishment of crime. It was not always so. 37  At
common law, private parties could seek vengeance by bringing
criminal actions. They may do so to this day in some jurisdictions,
albeit subject to various severe restrictions. Without a doubt,
however, the public prosecutor, the ostensibly conflict-free employee
of the state, has been the dominant enforcer of the criminal law in
America for well over two hundred years."9
The Supreme Court commented at length on the modem
importance of the conflict-free prosecutor to our system of justice in
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.' This case had its
inception in a trademark action by Louis Vuitton, S.A., against the
Klaymincs and their family-owned handbag business.24' The parties
entered into a settlement agreement, part of which was embodied in
a permanent injunction requiring the Klaymincs to refrain from
further infringement. They infringed anyway.2 2 Vuitton's attorney
asked the district court to appoint him and a colleague as special
236. See supra text accompanying notes 164-75.
237. For discussions of the history of private prosecution in England and the United
States, see John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511,515-20 (1994), Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the
Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 357, 359-70 (1986), and Joan Meier,
The "Right" to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking Public and
Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85,101-03 (1992).
238. See Bessler, supra note 237, at 529-43.
239. See Andrew Sidman, Comment, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution,
25 AM. U. L. REV. 754,762 (1976).
240. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
241. See i. at 790.
242. See id at 790-91.
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counsel to prosecute the Klaymincs for criminal contempt."3 The
court granted this request, and, upon learning of the arrangement,
the Chief of the Criminal Division of the local United States
Attorney's Office wished the Vuitton attorney good luck.2" Sol
Klayminc was later convicted of criminal contempt and sentenced to
five years imprisonment; four accomplices were convicted of aiding
and abetting. 5
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the
district court had erred in appointing the attorneys of an interested
party to prosecute the criminal contempt.4' The Court began the
relevant analysis with a reflection on the role of the prosecutors in
the federal courts:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer.247
The Court observed that, because prosecutors owe fidelity to the
state, they may not act as counsel for clients whose interests may
conflict with those of the state-indeed, if a Justice Department
attorney with the same conflicts of interest as the Vuitton attorneys
had prosecuted the criminal contempt, that government attorney
would have been subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 208(a),
which provides for a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment for up to
two years.m The reason for this policy is obvious:
The Government's interest [in a criminal contempt
prosecution] is in dispassionate assessment of the propriety
of criminal charges for affronts to the Judiciary. The private
party's interest is in obtaining the benefits of the court's
order. While these concerns sometimes may be congruent,
sometimes they may not. A prosecutor may be tempted to
bring a tenuously supported prosecution if such a course
promises financial or legal rewards for the private client.
243. See id. at 791.
244. See i. at 791-92.
245. See ad at 792.
246. See id. at 790. Notably, the Court based its decision on its supervisory authority
over federal courts rather than on constitutional analysis. See id.
247. Id. at 802 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,88 (1935)).
248. See id. at 803 & n.13 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1994)).
[Vol. 76530
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Conversely, a prosecutor may be tempted to abandon a
meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing benefits to
the private client is conditioned on a recommendation
against criminal charges. 49
Moreover, the Court observed that the ethics of the legal
profession, such as they are, compel a prosecutor who represents an
interested party to consider that party's interests as well as those of
the government. Taint is inevitable.' A plurality of the Court added
that the error of appointing an interested prosecutor is reversible per
se, because "[j]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'
Prosecutors are hardly "neutral" parties in a court proceeding;
they are supposed to represent zealously the interests of the state.
They also, however, are supposed to be "neutral" in the limited sense
of lacking a personal or financial ax to grind against defendants. The
prosecutor's ethical duty is to enforce the law evenly-without regard
to person. Of course, the ostensible purity of heart of the conflict-
free public prosecutor is not a guarantee that, in any given case, a
salaried prosecutor's notion of an appropriate charge and
punishment for alleged crimes would be more just (with regard to
retribution) and cost-effective (with regard to deterrence) than those
of a crime victim acting as a private prosecutor or of a prosecutor
paid by the conviction. Indeed, drawing such comparisons is difficult
because determining "optimal" criminal punishments presents some
of the same measurement problems as determining optimal punitive
awards. The universe has not given us an absolute scale for
determining how much sin equals how much time in prison or how
big a fine to pay to the state. 2 Nonetheless, despite this uncertainty,
it seems fair to hazard that the practice of leaving the prosecution of
alleged criminals to their alleged victims is unsettling to our modem
legal system's notions of just procedure as they apply outside the
anomalous context of punitive damages. The notion of paying
prosecutors by the conviction or, perhaps worse, rewarding them
personally with convicts' property (which is essentially what punitive
damages do, of course) is, to say the least, even more unsettling.
In fairness, however, the case for "neutral" state prosecution of
punitive damages claims is not without problems. For one thing, it
249. Id. at 805.
250. See id. at 804.
251. Id. at 811 (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
252. Arguably, if we had precise answers to these questions, we would not care so
much about criminal procedure. A person with an answer key does not need to care
much about the process by which a problem is solved.
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would not do to be too naive about state officials' motivations. The
proposal envisions that a division of a state attorney general's office
would be in charge of seeking punitive damages. No doubt the
political pressures and ambitions that buffet such offices would at
times unduly influence prosecutorial decisionmaking with regard to
punitive damages-just as politics sometimes affects decisions on
whether and how vigorously to prosecute crimes. One can easily
imagine situations in which it would seem politically wise to use
punitive damages to "beat up" on an unpopular, wealthy, out-of-state
corporate defendant (tobacco companies come to mind as potential
targets) to enrich the state treasury and to enhance the attorney
general's chance of becoming governor. By the same token, one can
imagine situations in which state officials might refrain from using
the punitive club to curry favor with powerful monied interests.
These are legitimate concerns. Still, the unfortunate fact that
political pressure might cause some state officials sometimes to
violate their duty to enforce the law evenly cannot justify the
continued existence of a system in which the natural, rational,
economic self-interest of plaintiffs and their attorneys must taint (or
appear to taint, at all odds) virtually all punitive damages
determinations.
A critic of the proposal might also plausibly object that the case
for "neutral" state prosecution of punitive damages claims should not
rely on analogies to criminal prosecution because of some obvious
differences between the civil and criminal contexts. For instance, one
could plausibly argue that the need to avoid conflicts is less urgent in
the punitive damages context because only money is at stake and civil
juries cannot sentence defendants to terms of imprisonment. Given
that juries sometimes impose awards running into the many millions
of dollars, this argument seems a bit disingenuous.l 3 One could also
distinguish the two contexts, however, with the observation that
"[p]rosecutors have 'available a terrible array of coercive methods to
obtain information'" that private punitive damages plaintiffs lack."
This is certainly true, but, on the other hand, legislatures,
prosecutors, and judges play a smaller role in the control of punitive
damages under the present system than they do in the control of
criminal punishment (a problem discussed in the next section).
253. See supra notes 4, 153-63 and accompanying text (discussing the size of punitive
awards).
254. Young, 481 U.S. at 811 (quoting CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
460 (1986)).
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Given juries' vast and untutored power over this device, one could
reasonably argue that it is all the more important that representatives
of the state without financial and personal conflicts prosecute claims
for punitive damages.
Professor Morris suggested over sixty years ago that critics of
punitive awards had the burden to prove that private prosecution led
to improper verdicts. Perhaps Professor Morris's allocation of the
burden of proof is fair if the issue is whether or not to abandon
punitive damages completely. If, however, one grants that the
superbifurcation model provides sufficient incentives for plaintiffs
and prosecutors to cooperate in pressing punitive damages claims
where appropriate, then the terms of the debate change. The issue
then becomes whether or not private plaintiffs or public prosecutors
should represent the public interest in actions that determine how
harshly to punish defendants. In this debate, for all (or at least most)
of the reasons discussed in Young, the burden should be on those
favoring the practice of permitting financially interested plaintiffs to
drive punitive damages litigation to produce compelling and clear-cut
policy reasons for this stance. Changing the punitive damages regime
as proposed to make room for state prosecution would both remove a
conceptually indefensible influence on verdicts-plaintiffs' desire for
money-and, by the same token, enhance the legitimacy of this
device as a means to punish.
B. Checking and Educating the Jury
One of the most notable features of the traditional punitive
damages regime is the huge power it gives juries to determine in the
first instance when to punish and how much to punish. The vast
scope of jury power in this context stands in sharp relief to its role in
criminal punishment, where legislatures, prosecutors, and judges all
play more significant roles than they do in determining punitive
awards, and it naturally increases the chances of outlandish verdicts.
By giving to prosecutors the power to initiate punitive damages
actions (based on earlier, plaintiff-driven findings of punitive
liability) and to set an upper limit on awards (because juries would
not be allowed to award more than prosecutors request),
superbifurcation would provide a salutary check on jury discretion in
this context. On a closely related note, prosecutors, by virtue of their
jobs, have far more knowledge than juries about their states' past
punishment practices, and one could expect that the state officials put
in charge of punitive damages actions would develop particular
expertise with regard to their use as a means to punish. Thus, these
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officials would possess an institutional perspective on punishment
and proportionality that juries should hear before exercising their
vast discretion to decide how harshly to punish malicious torts.
1. Separation of Powers and Criminal Punishment
A good way to get a sense of the scope of jury power over
punitive damages is first to examine the checks and balances
governing the power to punish crime-a context in which the jury's
role is far more limited. Criminal punishment requires a two-step
process: (1) the defendant must be found guilty (i.e., criminally
liable); and (2) the defendant must then be sentenced. With regard
to the first step, the legislature, prosecutor, judge, and jury all stand
between an actor and any finding of criminal liability. Legislatures
do so by defining what conduct is criminal. Generalizing, if a
legislature chooses not to criminalize certain conduct, then no other
state actor may inflict criminal punishment for it.5 Prosecutors, of
course, decide whether to charge potential defendants with criminal
activity. If a prosecutor chooses for any reason not to bring an action
against an offender, then, once again, for most practical purposes no
other state actor may inflict criminal punishment.5 6 Suppose the
prosecutor decides to press charges. The defendant may plea bargain
or go to trial. If the defendant chooses to risk trial, then he or she is
entitled, for more serious crimes, to a jury determination of guilt.
Even at a jury trial, the judge, too, may play a role in this decision
because if the prosecution's case is especially weak, the defendant
may ask for a judgment of acquittal. 7
The power to determine sentence-the amount of punishment as
opposed to guilt-is distributed differently. In the run of cases, the
legislature, prosecutor, and judge together decide how harsh criminal
punishment should be; juries typically are excluded. The legislature
prescribes the range of permissible punishments for any given crime.
The prosecutor, by deciding how to charge, sets an upper limit. If, for
instance, the prosecutor charges a killer with voluntary manslaughter
instead of murder, then the killer need not fear being punished as a
murderer. Suppose the killer is convicted of voluntary manslaughter,
255. See, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall,
C.J.) ("[T]he power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
department. It is the legislature, not the court which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.").
256. This was not always the case. See supra note 237 (citing authority on the role of
the private prosecutor in American jurisprudence).
257. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
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for which the legislature has prescribed five to fifteen years in prison.
The judge traditionally has had vast discretion to sentence the
offender to the term that struck the judge as most appropriate within
that range.2'8 In most jurisdictions, however, juries generally do not
play a role in passing sentences. 9 The most obvious exception to this
rule is that a jury may play a key role in determining whether to put a
defendant to death.20 On a less legal note, juries uncomfortable with
potentially harsh sentences retain the practical (if not legal) power to
ignore judicial instructions and find a defendant not guilty or guilty of
a lesser crime rather than convict for the most serious crime
warranted by the facts.
These divisions among the branches of the powers to decide
whether and how much to punish crime are simply applications of the
general doctrine of separation of powers. The legislature makes the
laws that criminalize conduct and establish ranges for punishment;
the executive enforces these laws; and the judiciary applies them-
with the jury usually deciding guilt and the judge passing sentence.
What makes this commonplace observation noteworthy is that
criminal punishment, perhaps more than any other area of the law,
highlights the fundamental rationale behind separation of powers-
the preservation of liberty and the prevention of arbitrary, tyrannous
governmental conduct. Montesquieu, a writer eagerly read by the
framers of our Constitution and a keen observer of the English legal
system, stated this rationale as follows:
The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind
arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In
order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be
so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another.
When the legislative and executive powers are united in
the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there
258. Of course, in many jurisdictions, there has been a move toward more determinant
sentencing, as is exemplified by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See Kevin R.
Seitz, Sentencing Reform in the States: An Overview of the Colorado Law Review
Symposium, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 645, 647-48 (1993) (providing an overview of state
attempts to control sentencing). One of the goals of this movement has been to reduce
the "sweeping" power of judges to determine sentences. See Marvin S. Frankel &
Leonard Orland, A Conversation About Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U.
COLO. L. REv. 655,655-56 (1993).
259. See Atlas Food Sys. and Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587,
594-95 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing juries' limited role in and competence for sentencing as a
justification for less deferential judicial review of punitive awards). See generally Ellis,
supra note 14, at 1004 n.172 (citing this general rule and exceptions).
260. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (commenting that jury
participation in death penalty determinations often is viewed as a good thing).
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can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to
execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not
separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined
with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would
be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then
the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with violence and oppression. T6
Separation of powers is not fundamentally about labeling powers as
legislative, executive, or judicial; it is, as James Madison wrote, an
"essential precaution in favor of liberty, ' 2 a device to prevent
arbitrary, oppressive governmental action. The criminal law is
replete with opportunities for tyrannical officials to fine, imprison,
and kill. It therefore follows that division of the power to punish
crimes is one of the most important applications of the separation-of-
powers doctrine.
Of course, the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers
has no application whatsoever to juries. The rationale behind this
doctrine, however, does-at least in part. Separation of powers
keeps the branches weak and ensures that no one of them can set up
a permanent tyranny. Juries are temporary bodies thrown together
to decide the facts of a case. They therefore pose no danger of taking
over the country. However, in addition to preventing naked power
grabs, the practice of dividing power serves another salutary effect
that applies just as much to juries as it does to any other political
power center: The cooperative and consensus requirements of this
practice must tend as a general matter to ensure that no
governmental power can step far outside the mainstream or take
extreme steps to upset the status quo because the other powers will
likely check such attempts. To be blunt, where power is "separated"
into several centers, if one actor tries anything crazy, the other actors
will stop it.
The principle that more heads are better than fewer operates in
many areas of the law and politics. For instance, juries traditionally
have had twelve people. The selection of the number twelve was not
the result of an empirical study designed to determine the optimal
261. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU (M. DE SECONDAT), 1 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk.
XI, ch. 6, 151-52 (Thomas Nugent trans., Colonial Press, rev. ed. 1899) (1766).
262. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 243 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). For a
modem exposition of the importance of separation of powers to liberty, see MARTIN H.
REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCrURE 99-134 (1995).
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size for truth-seeking committees; it was a historical accident. How
many jurors is "best"? This is not the sort of question that has a
precise answer. Notwithstanding this line-drawing problem,
however, it seems fair to speculate that most people would be
uncomfortable with two-person juries-for the rather obvious reason
that larger juries are less likely to be influenced by non-mainstream
idiosyncrasies.2 For the most part, the desire to prevent arbitrary,
idiosyncratic exercises of power favors larger juries. On the other
hand, convenience favors smaller juries, or even no juries at all;
similarly, one might argue that efficiency concerns justify replacing
tripartite government with dictatorship. As is the case with so many
other problems in the law, we balance these concerns not by
consulting rigorously researched empirical data, but by consulting a
combination of tradition and notions of fairness, which have
themselves been formed by tradition.
2. Separation of Powers and Punitive Damages
Historically, legislatures, prosecutors, and judges have played far
smaller roles in inflicting punitive awards than in punishing crimes,
and juries have filled the resultant power vacuum. For instance, in
many states, legislatures historically have forfeited any significant
role in defining what conduct merits liability for traditional, common-
law punitive damages. Generally speaking, to commit a crime, a
person must engage in conduct that includes all the requisite
legislatively prescribed elements, which, for many crimes, are quite
specific. By contrast, whether by statute or judicial decision, the only
"element" usually necessary to trigger traditional punitive damages
liability is that a defendant commit a tort that a jury deems
particularly "malicious."' ' The jury fills the conceptual gap created
by this lack of further legislative definition by deciding for itself what
"malice" is. In the criminal context, prosecutors play an operational
role in defining the scope of liability because of their charging role; of
course, they play no such role in the punitive damages process-that
role is usurped by plaintiffs and their attorneys. By contrast, the
balance of judge and jury power with regard to liability decisions is
more or less the same for punitive damages as it is for crime. In
either context, the jury is the primary fact-finder. However, where
263. A couple of related thought experiments: Imagine a three-person Congress or a
one-person Supreme Court.
264. For a commentary on the definitional emptiness of words such as "malice" and its
many kin, see Dobbs, supra note 35, at 840-41.
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the case for either a punitive award or a criminal conviction is
especially weak, the judge may take the relevant issues away from the
jury.' The long and short of the situation, however, is that juries
have tremendous discretionary power to define for themselves what
conduct is "malicious" and merits punitive liability.
After reaching a decision to hold a defendant punitively liable,
juries traditionally have possessed vast power to determine how big
an award to impose; by way of stark contrast, they play virtually no
such role in criminal sentencing in most jurisdictions.' Recent
reforms have, however, somewhat checked this jury power to ladle
out punishment. Perhaps most notably, whereas legislatures, by their
inaction, traditionally have left juries free to impose whatever
damages seemed to them necessary to punish and deter, many
legislatures now cap the awards juries can inflict. 7 As was noted
earlier, some commentators have criticized these caps as arbitrary
because they bear no relationship to the goals of punitive damages to
punish and deter.m Ignore for a moment the many problems in
determining the "optimal" size of punitive awards and posit that a big
corporate defendant "needs" $1 million worth of punishment and
deterrence for its wanton act that caused $10,000 worth of damage.
Suppose a legislative cap on punitive damages limits them to
$250,000 or three times compensatory damages-whichever is less.
Application of the cap in our posited case would result in a $30,000
punitive award-$970,000 short of what was needed. The purposes of
punitive damages have been frustrated, and a bad actor has escaped
justice. Once one remembers, however, that juries are centers of
political power-albeit temporary ones, a separation-of-powers
perspective offers a defense for caps to this charge of arbitrary
limitation. One can admit (at least for purposes of argument) that
punitive awards, properly doled out, may be useful to punish and
deter malicious torts but still insist that the traditional punitive
damages regime creates the danger that juries will: (1) inflict
punitive awards on defendants whose conduct does not warrant it,
and (2) inflict awards that are larger than really necessary. Caps may
be characterized as legislative determinations that the advantages of
reducing jury power to limit the impact of jury mistakes outweigh the
265. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (motion for summary judgment); FED. R. CRIM. P. 29
(motion for judgment of acquittal).
266. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 94 (listing examples of legislative caps).
268. See supra note 95.
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danger that caps will prevent juries from inflicting "ideal" awards.
Caps are a legislative check on juries.
Of course, as prosecutors are absent from the punitive damages
process, judges pose the only other potential check on this jury power
to tailor punishment. The relationship between the jury and judge in
determining the proper size of a punitive award is not simple. As an
initial matter, the jury, in an exercise of vast discretion (caps aside),
decides the size of the award. The trial judge then reviews the award
for "excessiveness. ' Excessiveness review is generally supposed to
be deferential; if the jury's award is reasonable, the judge cannot
alter it merely because the judge thinks a different award would be
even more reasonable.2 0 If, however, the judge concludes that the
award is higher than any rational trier of fact could properly bestow
("crazy," in lay language), then the judge should offer the winning
plaintiff the choice of remittitur or facing a new trial on punitive
damages. Judicial review is a very real, if standardless, constraint on
punitive awards; the jarringly high awards one hears reported often
are reduced by the trial judge or on appeal.' Nonetheless, the jury,
by determining the amount of a punitive award in the first instance,
sets the terms of any subsequent debate over the proper amount, and,
in practice, still exercises vast power over the harshness of punitive
awards.
To summarize the very obvious, in stark contrast with their more
limited role in punishing crime, in the punitive damages context,
juries enjoy the primary power to decide what actions merit punitive
liability and how harshly to punish them.
3. Prosecutors as a Check on Jury Punitive Damages Determinations
In one sense, a jury cannot get the decision to impose punitive
liability wrong because the jury defines what conduct warrants such
liability when it decides what "malice" means in practice. Practically
speaking, the jury also gets first crack at defining how much
punishment that conduct warrants by way of punitive damages. Thus,
269. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 421 ("Judicial review of the
size of punitive damage awards has been a safeguard against excessive verdicts for as long
as punitive damages have been awarded."); see also supra notes 85-87 and accompanying
text (discussing judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards and the practice of
remittitur).
270. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing standards for remittitur).
271. See supra note 87. Of course, judges do not always choose to exercise this power.
See Camp, supra note 4, at 10 (reporting trial judge's refusal to reduce the jury's $5 billion
punitive award in the Exxon Valdez case).
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to claim that a given jury erred in making these determinations is
merely to offer alternative definitions of malice and appropriate
punishment. This is largely what a trial judge does when she finds a
jury award excessive and gives the victorious plaintiff the choice
between remittitur and a new trial on punitive damages-the trial
judge substitutes personal notions of fairness for those of the jury. If
all punitive damages determinations largely turn on subjective
fairness judgments, however, then why not leave the jury with
plenary power over them? After all, so long as our legal system
permits punitive awards, why should one prefer a judge's fairness
intuitions over those of a jury? Or, more to the point for purposes of
the superbifurcation proposal, why would one want prosecutors
deciding whether to sue defendants for punitive damages and setting
an upper limit on how high an award a jury can inflict?
One reason is that, in light of the lessons of separation of
powers, juries enjoy an alarming amount of relatively unchecked
power to inflict punitive damages, and giving prosecutors a charging
and enforcement role in bringing actions for punitive damages would
dilute this power. Obviously, the rationales behind separation of
powers do not apply with full force to juries because there is no
danger that a jury collected for the limited purpose of determining
the "facts" of one case is tyrannically going to ride roughshod over
the country, as the relatively permanent institutions of the legislature,
executive, or judiciary might. Still, much of our political system
seems based on the intuition that forcing competing power centers to
reach consensus gives rise to better decisionmaking. This rationale
certainly applies in the context of punitive damages, where jury
decisions can have extremely serious consequences.'
Of course, just stating the proposition that it is good to distribute
the state's power to punish among several entities still leaves the line-
drawing problem alluded to earlier. For instance, if the presence of
four separate authorities in the context of criminal punishment (i.e.,
the legislature, prosecutor, judge, and jury) helps decrease the risk of
arbitrary state action that unfairly punishes the innocent or punishes
the guilty too harshly, then why not distribute this power to punish
among twenty-three authorities, or thirty-one, or any prime number
one likes? There is no scientific answer to this question-four is the
traditional number and our judicial machinery is set up for it. Seat-
of-the-pants judgment, as no doubt shaped by our legal traditions,
272. See supra notes 4, 153-63 and accompanying text (discussing the size of punitive
awards).
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also dictates that, at a certain point, the protection that extra
decisionmakers give against bad decisions is too cumbersome to be
worth the trouble and, indeed, may give rise to too many "false
negatives," i.e., too many layers of decisionmakers give the guilty too
many chances to fool the authorities and escape punishment.
All that having been said, the superbifurcation proposal provides
a relatively easy, straightforward way to add another power center to
the punitive damages process. Punitive awards are rare.. It therefore
would not be difficult or prohibitively expensive for any given state
to establish a small division within its attorney general's office
devoted to prosecution of punitive damages actions; superbifurcation
would not overwhelm prosecutors' offices-or courts, for that
matter-in a sea of suits.m  Given the ease with which
superbifurcation could be implemented, if one grants that this system
would serve the retribution and deterrence purposes of punitive
damages roughly as well as the current system (at least to some
acceptable degree), then the burden of proof should be on those who
contend that it is not a good idea to give prosecutors a check on the
vast jury power to inflict punitive damages.
A second, closely related argument in favor of giving prosecutors
the exclusive power to bring actions for punitive damages (as distinct
from punitive liability) is that they possess a perspective that juries
should hear before making their decisions on how harshly to punish
for malicious torts. As was discussed earlier, these determinations
necessarily involve subjective fairness judgments and invite juries to
give vent to their intuitions on how much wrong warrants how much
money. Notwithstanding the necessarily subjective nature of these
fairness judgments and the problems this subjectivity creates for
disciplined, rigorous review of punitive awards, most people probably
would agree that proportionality is a critical component of fair
punishment and that proper respect for proportionality requires
knowledge of past punishment practices. Thus, juries should inflict
similarly harsh retributory punishments for similarly reprehensible
wrongs.274 Prosecutors, by virtue of their jobs, have far more
experience than any jury in seeing how the legal system punishes
wrongdoing of varying degrees of reprehensibility.275 They would be
273. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
274. Of course, which wrongs are worse than others is itself a subjective judgment, but
that fact does not alter the point that, however they "rank" wrongs, people expect
proportionality.
275. Cf Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594-
95 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that judges, because of their courtroom experience, are
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duty-bound to use this experience in assessing how high a punitive
damages award to seek in any given case and to impart this
experience to the jury so that it would have a broader perspective
from which to determine how much retribution a given defendant
deserved. Furthermore, unlike private attorneys, prosecutors would
have no financial reason not to impart such information. This same
concern over proportionality also applies to the other ostensible
purpose for punitive damages-deterrence. Realistically speaking,
there is no good, accepted formula to determine objectively how
strong a deterrence signal to send to any given wrongdoer. Given
this lack of an absolute scale, proportionality again should play a
strong role in determining a "fair" award, and thus, as is the case with
retribution, the prosecutor's experienced perspective should prove
useful to the jury.m
Juries possess tremendous power over punitive awards. The
lessons of separation of powers, particularly as applied in the criminal
law, suggest that it would be a good idea to check this power by
adopting the superbifurcation proposal, which would give state
prosecutors the tasks of determining when to seek punitive
damages-based on underlying plaintiff-driven findings of punitive
liability-and of setting the maximum amounts juries could award.
Furthermore, prosecutors, as a rule, have far more experience in
observing punishment in the legal system than do juries, and thus
should possess a perspective on proportionality that juries would find
useful in deciding how harsh a punitive award to inflict in any given
case.
C. Rationalizing the Punishment of Mass Torts
Mass torts raise an especially thorny punitive damages problem:
better suited than juries for the task of determining how harshly to punish).
276. A proper realism with regard to human nature, however, should lead one to
conclude that political pressures and personal ambitions to win large judgments would
affect the way in which state officials would prosecute some punitive damages actions,
which, in those instances, would lessen or destroy the advantages associated with hearing
the state's prosecutorial "point of view."
277. One could argue that adding prosecutors to the punitive damages process adds
little information to the process as a whole because the judges who review punitive
awards under the current system are just as capable as prosecutors of bringing their legal
experience to bear on proportionality concerns. When prosecutors (and defense counsel,
for that matter) argue a case, however, they are making their knowledge and legal
experience available to the jury-albeit with an argumentative point of view. If the jury is
to have a say in determining the size of punitive awards at all, then it makes sense to give
it all the information possible up front rather than to deny it and then let the judge
attempt to clean up later by way of deferential review for "excessiveness."
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Imagine that a corporation builds and sells a product-it could be
asbestos, Agent Orange, the Dalkon Shield, breast implants, etc.-
that allegedly causes death or injury to thousands of people. Assume
thousands sue 8 and that multiple cases reach verdicts that award
punitive damages.2 9 Under what circumstances is it fair, or even
constitutional, to inflict multiple punitive awards on the defendant?
A number of defendants have argued that such multiple awards
violate due process, but none successfully.n Still, examination of the
fairness and practicality concerns underlying some of the relevant
decisions makes one thing seem clear: Doling out punishment in
numerous discrete actions for a single course of conduct may be
constitutional, but it is not sensible. It would be far better to
administer punishment in one proceeding in which the factfinder
could hear all available evidence relevant to the entire course of
conduct that gave rise to punitive liability. The proposed model
pushes the procedures for assessment of punitive damages in that
278. Some sources have estimated that plaintiffs have filed well over 100,000 asbestos
suits and that hundreds of thousands more may be expected over the next five decades.
See Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1393-94 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Weis, J., dissenting),
modified in part, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993). Breast implant litigation presents a similarly
overwhelming picture: "By early 1995, [Dow Coming Corporation] was a Defendant in
45 putative class action lawsuits ... and over 19,000 individual lawsuits. All the suits
combined involved more than 36,000 claimants." In re Dow Coming Corp., 187 B.R. 919,
922 (E.D. Mich. 1995), rev'd, 103 F.3d 129 (6th Cir. 1996).
279. For instance, 15 punitive awards had been awarded against Johns-Manville Corp.,
the largest manufacturer of asbestos, by the time it declared bankruptcy in 1982. See
BOSTON, supra note 36, § 21:7, at 11.
280. See, e.g., Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1391; Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d
277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990); Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1465-66 (D. Haw.
1989); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1060-64 (D.N.J.) (Juzwin 1),
judgment vacated on reh'g, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989) (Juzwin 11); Neal v. Carey
Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd sub nom. Van Buskirk
v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985); Stevens v. Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr. 525, 531-33 (1996); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v.
Wasiak, 917 S.W.2d 883, 888-92 (Tex. App. 1996). There are a number academic
discussions of the problem of multiple punitive awards for mass torts. See, e.g., Jerry J.
Phillips, Multiple Punitive Damages Awards, 39 VILL. L. REV. 433 (1994) (arguing that
multiple punitive awards pose no constitutional problems and observing that defendants
who feel "oppressed" by such awards may seek to reduce them in post-trial proceedings
or avoid paying them by declaring bankruptcy); Gary T. Schwartz, Mass Torts and
Punitive Damages: A Comment, 39 VILL. L. REV. 415 (1994) (analyzing multiple punitive
awards in light of double jeopardy and joinder principles of criminal law); Richard A.
Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness,
Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 37 (1983) (suggesting that courts consider
alternatives such as class actions, aggressive dismissals of unfounded punitive claims,
bifurcation, and close scrutiny of awards to protect defendants from repetitive awards);
Note, Class Actions for Punitive Damages, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1787 (1983) (suggesting use
of the class action device).
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direction by limiting the number of punitive damages suits to one per
state for any given course of tortious conduct, i.e., each state adopting
superbifurcation would have one opportunity to seek punitive
damages for all wrongful conduct and attendant harms that occurred
within that state's jurisdiction.2'
As a threshold matter, the premise that it is unfair to use the
machinery of state more than once per sovereign to prosecute or
punish a given criminal offense is enshrined in the Double Jeopardy
281. Two states, Georgia and Ohio, have already taken steps to limit the number of
times a defendant may be sued for punitive damages for a given course of conduct. In
1987, Georgia adopted a statute that provided that only one recovery was permissible for
any given act or omission in products liability actions-no matter how many causes of
action may have arisen from such act or omission. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1)
(Supp. 1997). A federal district court, in an opinion that might fairly be called
Lochneresque, ruled that this provision violated due process because it was not rationally
related to any legitimate state interest and violated equal protection because it
irrationally discriminated against products liability plaintiffs. See McBride v. General
Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1576-77 (M.D. Ga. 1990). One could attack the
McBride decision on any number of grounds. Suffice it to say for present purposes,
however, that the superbifurcation proposal: (1) rationally furthers a legitimate state
interest in punishing malicious torts in a disciplined manner; and (2) does not irrationally
discriminate against products liability plaintiffs. Cf. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436
S.E.2d 635, 638-40 (Ga. 1993) (suggesting strongly in dicta that one-suit limitation is
perfectly reasonable and constitutional).
Similarly, Ohio recently reformed its tort law to provide that no punitive damages
may be awarded against a defendant that provides a certified judgment or other evidence
demonstrating that it has already paid the maximum punitive damages allowable under
Ohio law in some other case due to the same act or course of conduct alleged by the
plaintiff. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(3)(a) (Anderson Supp. 1996). The
statute carves two exceptions to this one-recovery rule; multiple recoveries are allowed
where: (1) a plaintiff demonstrates to the court that it will rely on previously
undiscovered evidence of the defendant's malice; or (2) the court determines that
previous punitive awards were "totally insufficient" to punish and deter. See id.
§ 2315.21(D)(3)(b)(i)-(ii).
As the Georgia and Ohio reforms demonstrate, it is not logically necessary to put
state officials in charge of punitive damages actions in order to limit the number of
punitive recoveries for mass torts. The superbifurcation model is clearly superior to these
reforms for at least two reasons, however. First, limiting punitive recoveries but leaving
private plaintiffs in control of punitive actions encourages an uncoordinated race to the
courthouse. State officials would be in a better position to marshal all relevant evidence
of defendant wrongdoing to ensure that the one allowable recovery is just. Cf. infra text
following note 321 (discussing the need for prosecutors under the superbifurcation system
to use their one chance at recovery judiciously). Second, even though no one has a
"right" to punitive damages, there is something unseemly about granting a punitive
recovery to one plaintiff but not to all others, who may number in the thousands. Cf.
Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1386 (noting that accepting defendant's invitation to hold that multiple
punitive awards violate due process would unfairly favor some plaintiffs over others).
Punitive damages are assessed to serve the public interest; superbifurcation puts them in
the public's coffers, where they belong.
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Clause.m The Supreme Court has indicated that, legally speaking,
this clause has no application to private suits for punitive damages.'
Nonetheless, there is no obvious policy reason why the basic fairness
concerns behind proscribing multiple prosecutions and punishments
should not be applied to punishment generally, rather than just to
criminal punishment.' The structure of the current punitive
damages regime, however, makes it more or less impossible for
courts to do so in the context of punishment of mass torts.
One case in particular, Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,M has
attracted a good deal of scholarly attention and highlights the
difficulties facing courts wrestling with this problem. In Juzwin I, the
plaintiffs sought punitive damages for conduct related to the
manufacture of asbestos.m In his first opinion in this case, Judge
Sarokin expressed concern that asbestos plaintiffs often introduce
evidence of the total number of persons suffering from asbestos-
related diseases to enhance claims for punitive damages and that it is
"totally unrealistic to suggest that [a given jury's] award is predicated
solely on the conduct of the defendant manufacturer as it relates only
to the plaintiff on trial." He then ruled that multiple punitive
damages awards for a "single course of conduct" were fundamentally
unfair and violated the Due Process Clause, and therefore issued an
order stating that the court would strike the plaintiffs' punitive
damages claims against any defendant who provided competent
evidence that it had already paid punitive damages for the same
course of conduct at issue.'
In Juzwin II, Judge Sarokin vacated his earlier order largely
282. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]"). Of course, as the convoluted
nature of double jeopardy jurisprudence itself demonstrates, it is hardly self-evident how
to apply this fairness norm in practice. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135,
2147-49 (1996) (discussing application of Double Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeiture and
explaining that civil forfeiture of respondent's home was not "punishment"); Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397-99 (1995) (explaining that use of uncharged criminal
conduct (importing cocaine) as a basis for imposing a higher sentence for federal
marijuana charges did not "punish" defendant for importing cocaine, leaving United
States free to pursue a subsequent criminal prosecution on cocaine charges).
283. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989) ("The protections of the
Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by litigation between private parties.").
284. Cf. id. at 447-48 (making largely this same point).
285. 705 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J.) (Juzwin 1), judgment vacated on reh'g, 718 F. Supp.
1233 (D.N.J. 1989) (Juzwin I).
286. See id. at 1054.
287. Id. at 1056.
288. See id. at 1064.
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because he became convinced that the problem of mass tort
punishment required national reform from either the Supreme Court
or Congress. 9 This second opinion also makes clear, however, that
the judge was concerned by the problems inherent in determining
precisely what conduct juries in earlier cases had punished. Without
such information, Judge Sarokin could not determine whether the
Juzwin plaintiffs sought repetitive punishment for conduct that had
already been sanctioned, or if they instead sought to punish conduct
that had escaped sanction up until that time.
Suppose a company, during one general "course of conduct,"
builds a product that kills one thousand people. In double jeopardy
parlance, that company has committed one thousand "offenses" that,
if criminal, theoretically could give rise to one thousand prosecutions
and attendant punishments. Returning to Judge Sarokin's problem,
if juries in earlier asbestos cases had punished different "offenses"
than those at stake in Juzwin (e.g., those juries punished defendants
for causing harms to persons other than those whose injuries were at
issue in Juzwin), then additional punishment would pose no more
normative problem than would multiple sentences inflicted upon a
murderer who has killed more than one person.2" If, however, earlier
punitive awards were intended to punish precisely the same
"offenses" as those at stake in Juzwin, then another punitive award
would constitute multiple punishment and violate fundamental
fairness.
Judge Sarokin implicitly acknowledged this problem when he
held in Juzwin II that, for a defendant to demonstrate that it would
be fundamentally unfair for it to incur another punitive award for a
given course of conduct, that defendant must demonstrate to the
court that an earlier punitive award the defendant incurred arose in a
trial that met the following rigorous conditions:
1. A full and complete hearing must [have been] held,
after adequate time ... elapsed to investigate and discover
the full scope and consequences of such conduct and during
which all relevant evidence [was] presented regarding the
conduct of the defendant against whom the claim is made;
2. Adequate representation [was] afforded to the
plaintiff, with an opportunity for plaintiffs similarly situated
289. Juzwin 11, 718 F. Supp. at 1235.
290. See generally Schwartz, supra note 280, at 426 (observing that separate
prosecutions and punishments of distinct criminal counts arising out of one course of
conduct do not violate double jeopardy, and discussing implications for discussions of
punitive damages in the mass tort context).
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and their counsel to cooperate and contribute towards the
presentation of the punitive damages claim, including
presentation of the past and probable future consequences
of the defendant's wrongful conduct;
3. An appropriate instruction [must have been given]
to the jury that their award [would] be the one and only
award of punitive damages to be rendered against the
company for its wrongful conduct; [and]
4. Such other conditions as [would] assure a full, fair
and complete presentation of all the relevant evidence in
support of and in opposition to the claim. 9
In short, Juzwin II evades the problem of delineating the scope of
past punishments by placing the burden on the defendant of showing
that some earlier jury imposed a verdict explicitly designed to punish
the defendant's entire course of conduct and that this jury had all of
the information necessary to do so.
Judge Sarokin concluded that none of the Juzwin defendants
could meet these burdens, which is hardly surprising-the current
system is not designed to enable defendants to do so. Of course, it is
certainly in a plaintiff's interest to paint as horrible a picture of a
defendant's conduct as possible. Thus, a plaintiff may well introduce
evidence of the nationwide impact of a defendant's wrongful
behavior, e.g., lawyers for breast implant plaintiffs have argued that
the defendants' callousness has harmed many women, not just the
named plaintiffs.' A plaintiff, however, does not have the burden of
proving in detail all the harms caused by a defendant's course of
conduct to other potential plaintiffs. Many plaintiffs in a mass tort
context no doubt would lack the means to do so in any event. Thus,
as a practical matter, mass tort defendants may find it extremely
difficult to prove that a jury in an earlier action had all the
information necessary to inflict a single punitive award sufficient to
punish completely an entire course of conduct in light of all harms
291. Juzwin 11, 718 F. Supp. at 1235.
292. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 1994). The
court upheld a $6.5 million punitive award against Dow Coming Corporation, observing
that
[t]he evidence presented at trial established that a large number of Dow silicone
gel breast implants had been implanted in thousands of women. Each of these
women was at risk of encountering the same fate Hopkins suffered. Therefore,
Dow's conduct in exposing thousands of women to a painful and debilitating
disease, and the evidence that Dow gained financially from its conduct, may
properly be considered in imposing an award of punitive damages.
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flowing from it. Furthermore, precisely because the vast majority of
states permit multiple punitive awards, courts generally do not
instruct juries that only one punitive award may be inflicted per
course of conduct. Therefore, even if a defendant could show that a
given jury had the knowledge necessary to inflict complete
punishment for a course of conduct, the defendant would not be able
to show that the jury intended to do so.2 3
On occasion, a mass tort defendant will try to avoid the need for
precise inquiry into the scope of past juries' punishments (of the sort
demanded by Juzwin I1) by attempting to persuade a court that
further punitive awards in its particular case would be
unconstitutional because the combined total of such awards
previously inflicted already exceeds the maximum allowable under
due process for the defendant's whole course of conduct. This
approach has not met with much success either. For instance, in
Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp.,294 the Second Circuit rejected
out of hand the defendant's Juzwin-type "single-punitive award"
argument that past juries had intended to punish the defendant for
the "full extent of its wrongful conduct. ' 295 The court acknowledged,
however, at least the abstract possibility that past punitive awards
against a defendant could, in aggregate, inflict the maximum
punishment allowable under due process for a whole course of
conduct-making subsequent punitive awards impermissible.26 The
court, however, rejected Pittsburgh Corning's contention that this
"aggregate-punitive award" argument precluded further punishment
in Simpson because: (1) the defendant had not provided the trial
judge with a sufficient record to allow evaluation of the "entire scope
of the defendant's wrongful conduct" and the harms it caused, and
therefore the court lacked the factual record necessary to determine
the due process maximum; (2) relatedly, the defendant had, in any
event, made no showing that it had suffered punitive awards that
were "even close" to whatever this maximum might be; and (3)
returning to the concerns of Juzwin 11, the defendant had not
provided a sufficient basis for concluding that past awards punished
293. A defendant might be able to evade this problem by requesting that the jury
delineate the scope of conduct it intended to punish in a special verdict. Presumably,
defendants would be loath to do so on the ground that asking the jury this question would
tend to encourage it to take an expansive view of what conduct to punish.
294. 901 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1990).
295. Id at 281.
296. See id. at 280-81.
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the same misconduct as that at stake in Simpson."
The majority and dissenting opinions in Dunn v. HOVIC298
perhaps provide the most thorough appellate discussion of the
problems confronting application of this aggregate-punitive award
argument. A Virgin Islands jury awarded William Dunn, a former
pipe-fitter, $500,000 in compensatory damages for injuries he
suffered working with Kaylo, an insulation product containing
asbestos that was manufactured by Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corporation. In addition, the jury awarded $25 million in punitive
damages against Owens-Coming for failing to put warnings on boxes
of Kaylo.' 9 The district court reduced this amount on remittitur to $2
million.'
On appeal, Owens-Corning raised a battery of arguments against
the punitive award, but the most important from the court's
perspective (indeed, its reason for taking this "otherwise routine
product liability case in banc"') was Owens-Corning's argument that
the court should use its powers as the" 'Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands' "3 to strike all asbestos punitive damages claims in that
territory on the ground that the "avalanche" of claims against
asbestos manufacturers ensured that they had suffered enough to
meet all legitimate deterrence and retribution needs. Therefore,
further punitive awards would be "overkill."'
While the majority opinion agreed that multiple awards raised
serious concerns, it rejected the claim that, on the facts of Dunn,
Owens-Coming had suffered unconstitutional punishment. Taking a
page from Simpson, the majority assumed for purposes of argument
that a defendant could show a due process violation by providing a
judge with a sufficient factual record from which to conclude that
previous juries already had inflicted maximum punishment. It
concluded that Owens-Coming had not done so.4
In his dissent (which, in relevant part, four other members of the
court joined), Judge Weis insisted, like Judge Sarokin in Juzwin I,
297. See id. at 281.
298. 1 F.3d 1371 (3d Cir.) (en bane), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993).
299. See id at 1373-74,1391.
300. See id at 1391. The Third Circuit, providing yet another example of the vagaries
inherent in eyeballing punitive damages for excessiveness, sliced this $2 million figure to
$1 million without any meaningful discussion. See id.
301. See id at 1385.
302. Id. (quoting Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75,80 (3d Cir. 1986)).
303. Id. at 1385.
304. See id at 1389-90.
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that "courts must confront the unavoidable and undeniable fact that
defendants are being punished over and over again for the same
general course of conduct." ' At some point, multiple punitive
awards exceed just maximum punishment; the trick is to determine
where this maximum lies? °6 Judge Weis suggested that courts might
do so by using the factors the Supreme Court listed in Haslip as
useful in determining the excessiveness of punitive damages awards
generally.' In addition, however, courts should consider "other
matters unique to mass torts-other punitive awards, the effect of
those awards on current and future claimants for compensation [i.e.,
whether punitive awards threaten a company's solvency and thus its
ability to pay future compensatory awards], and the adverse effect on
settlement of pending claims." 3° After suggesting this standard for
multiple-punitive-award review, Judge Weis then stated his firm
belief that no further punitive awards were necessary to deter or
punish Owens-Corning.' In this vein, he observed that the company
had paid "compensatory awards, punitive damages, and litigation
expenses [that] dwarf any profits" attributable to its Kaylo product."'
A further punitive award to the Dunn plaintiffs would serve "no
rational purpose" and would violate due process.31" '
Notwithstanding Judge Weis's embrace of the aggregate-award
theory, close examination reveals that, like the Juzwin single-award
theory, it offers small comfort to mass-tort defendants. As a
threshold matter, under the Simpson and Dunn majority approach, it
requires a defendant to provide a judge with "a factual basis
sufficient for evaluating the entire scope of the defendant's wrongful
conduct," '312 presumably including all "past and probable future
consequences" of that conduct.' The defendant, too, may lack the
practical means to do so, e.g., even the asbestos manufacturers do not
know how many people asbestos has harmed and how severely they
have been injured.14
305. Id. at 1402 (Weis, J., dissenting).
306. See id. at 1404 (Weis, J., dissenting).
307. See supra text accompanying note 116 (listing the factors the Supreme Court
approved in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991)).
308. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1404 (Weis, J., dissenting).
309. See adt at 1405 (Weis, J., dissenting).
310. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 1404-05 (Weis, J., dissenting).
312. Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990); see also
Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1389 (quoting Simpson).
313. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D.N.J. 1989).
314. Of course, in an adversarial system, inviting defendants to proffer evidence of
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Another problem with the aggregate-award theory is that it cuts
off further awards only at the due process maximum, even though
punishment need not reach this maximum to be "just," as it were.
Suppose a jury imposed a $100 million punitive award in light of its
understanding that the defendant's conduct injured several thousand
people-including, of course, the plaintiff. No later jury would be
able to lower this figure, but some might effectively raise it. Suppose
a later jury in a case involving a different plaintiff also inflicts a
punitive award of $100 million because that jury, too, is aware that
the defendant harmed thousands of people. The defendant's
tentative punitive liability becomes $200 million. The judge in the
latter case, however, hears the defendant's aggregate-award
challenge and decides that the maximum punitive award permitted by
due process is $150 million, so the judge cuts the second award in
half. The defendant is then liable for $150 million, even though an
earlier jury, with largely the same course of conduct in mind, imposed
a presumptively sufficient award of only $100 million. Permitting
multiple punishments therefore creates a bias in favor of the
maximum punishments that due process allows. As such
punishments are not, by hypothesis, unconstitutionally excessive,
perhaps this is not such a terrible problem. However, there is
something decidedly discomfiting in letting later juries trump the
damages determinations of earlier juries until such time as a judge
sees fit to call a halt to the process." Compounding this problem,
given the vagaries inherent in punitive damages determinations, due
process maxima must necessarily be decided by the length of the
chancellor's foot.
Proponents of the current regime might well observe at this
point, however, that a defendant is free to try to avoid unfair
compounding of punishment by arguing to a jury that it should
subtract from any punitive award it would otherwise impose the
amounts already inflicted against the defendant in other proceedings.
Indeed, some states have passed statutes apparently encouraging this
approach."6  It does not seem terribly realistic, however. As
commentators have pointed out, defendants quite reasonably worry
that evidence of past awards might strengthen a jury's conclusion that
their own wrongdoing to try to avoid liability for multiple punitive awards should raise
some interesting conflicts.
315. Comparison to the criminal context is again illustrative: Imagine that, after
proving a defendant guilty, the state were free to seek successive sentencing hearings
from various judges until some judge sentenced the defendant to the maximum sentence
permitted under the relevant statutes and guidelines.
316. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West 1988).
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a defendant's conduct justified punishment and thus may lead to
more, larger punitive awards rather than fewer, smaller ones.3 17 A
more promising curative approach, which the Supreme Court
suggested in Haslip, is for judges to consider past punitive awards
when reviewing later awards for excessiveness, and some states allow
or require them to do so." Even if the results of such consideration,
however, were that judges conducting such reviews always subtracted
the entirety of earlier awards, this practice would not correct the bias
that multiple punishments create toward maximum punishments.
One could sidestep all the messiness inherent in repetitive
punitive awards if one could devise a system in which one factfinder
heard all relevant evidence of a defendant's course of conduct and
harms flowing from it and then inflicted one punitive award to punish
it all. Under BMW, however, the degree to which a state may use
punitive damages to punish and deter conduct occurring outside its
borders is, at the very least, problematic.19 One state-law based
action-and claims in mass-tort cases typically involve products
liability claims rooted in state law-to punish in light of all
nationwide misconduct and harms is probably not an option."2 The
superbifurcation proposal does the next best thing by forbidding
private suits for punitive damages and permitting each enacting state
just one chance to seek them for any given course of conduct and
attendant harms occurring within its borders. In the unlikely event
that every state and quasi-state (i.e., territories and the District of
Columbia) in the country adopted this proposal, then a mass-tort
317. See BOSTON, supra note 36, § 21:30, at 40. Such evidence presumably would pose
less of a prejudice problem in states allowing or requiring bifurcation of punitive liability
and damages phases. See, e.g., Stevens v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr.
2d 525, 536 (Ct. App. 1996) (observing that "the prejudice inherent in such evidence
relates more to liability for punitive damages than to the amount of the award"), rel'g
denied, 1997 Cal. LEXIS 61 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 1997). Even if a defendant could
totally avoid prejudice by presenting such evidence only in the damages phase, however,
this practice would not solve the problem that multiple punishments create a bias in favor
of maximum punishments.
318. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991) (approving
consideration of the "existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same
conduct, these ... to be taken in mitigation"); see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(5)
(West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(c) (1995).
319. See supra note 133.
320. As the substantive power of a state's law should not change in a diversity action,
the extra-territoriality concerns of BMW would apply to state-law-based diversity actions
in federal courts just as they do in state courts. While this Article does not address
directly the complications inherent in adopting superbifurcation as a reform of federal
law, it bears noting that these extraterritorial concerns should not apply to federal causes
of action.
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defendant could face no more than fifty-some punitive awards, rather
than the potential for many thousands.
Admittedly, such an approach would not be without risks. Most
obviously, limiting prosecutors to one action per enacting state
creates the danger that a defendant could be able to evade proper
punishment for its mass tort because, at the time of a state's punitive
damages suit, it lacked full knowledge of the harms the defendant
had caused. Prosecutors could, however, alleviate this problem by
adopting, where appropriate, a watch-and-wait attitude. They could,
for instance, observe the success (or lack thereof) of successive
private plaintiffs seeking compensatory awards and punitive liability
attorney's fees. Where, in products liability cases, causation raises
complex scientific issues (e.g., breast implant litigation), they could
study the relevant literature for insights into the level of harm the
defendant actually caused. In short, the one-suit limitation certainly
would require prosecutors to exercise due care in deciding when to
sue.
321
Another problem worth noting is that, precisely because it
allows each state to bring a punitive damages action, the proposed
model cannot completely fix the problem of overlapping multiple
punishments. If a defendant's course of conduct has obvious
nationwide impacts, then it may be unrealistic in a given case to hope
that these impacts would not color any given jury's determination of
how harshly to punish. In subsequent suits in other states,
nationwide impacts again could color such calculations, leading to
repetitive punishment for overlapping harms. Still, it is better to
have fewer rather than more opportunities for repetitive punishment,
and the proposal sharply limits the number of potential punitive
damages claimants.
Given that most cases settle, the proposal's effects on settlement
negotiations might be far more important than its effects on punitive
damages verdicts. Superbifurcation could remove the threat of
punitive damages as a bargaining tool in the bulk of mass-tort
lawsuits-ensuring that defendants would not suffer indirect
"punishment" every time they settle a claim. Where a plausible claim
for punitive damages exists, a plaintiff should be able to use this
claim to extract a punitive premium from the defendant.3 2 The
321. Cf. supra note 281 (noting that private plaintiffs operating under a system that
limits the number of punitive awards are not in a position to watch and wait).
322. See supra note 219 and Section IlI.C.2. (discussing punitive premiums in
settlement negotiations).
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premium the defendant would be willing to pay depends in part on
how big an award the defendant expects a jury would inflict.
Assume, as Judge Sarokin realistically suggested, that juries inflict
punitive awards based on all they learn of a defendant's course of
conduct and its attendant harms, rather than solely on the basis of
how this conduct harmed the given plaintiff." It follows that each
plaintiff negotiating a settlement should be able to extract a premium
based on the punitive award the defendant fears a jury would
inflict-and a judge subsequently would approve-to punish all the
tortious conduct and harms the defendant thinks the plaintiff could
prove. Thus, under the present punitive damages regime, the
potential for punishment of much or all of a defendant's whole course
of conduct inflates every settlement.3 4 Repetitive jury verdicts only
represent the tip of the multiple punishment iceberg.
Superbifurcation would largely eliminate the ability of many
mass-tort plaintiffs to extract punitive settlement premiums. A
defendant would have a strong interest in avoiding the first Section 1
finding of punitive liability in any given state for a given course of
conduct because that first finding would trigger vulnerability to a
Section 2 punitive damages action. Subsequent punitive liability
findings in that state, though they would create liability for additional
attorney's fees, would not have this gate-opening effect, and the
defendant's fear of such findings would lessen commensurately.
Therefore, plaintiffs would not be able to extract much of a premium
when settling in states in which the defendant has already been found
punitively liable. Before any such finding exists, a mass-tort
defendant would have a choice: to avoid trial by paying "full-sized"
premiums to settle claims, or to risk trial and a punitive liability
finding that would open the door to punitive damages. Giving
defendants this choice between "facing the (punitive) music" and
paying punitive premiums lessens any unfairness that may be
associated with repetitive punishment by settlement.
In sum, the premise that a defendant should face only once per
323. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (D.N.J.) (Juzwin 1),
judgment vacated on reh'g, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.NJ. 1989) (Juzwin II); supra note 287
and accompanying text.
324. Defendants have had trouble, however, persuading courts to consider punitive
settlement premiums when determining whether a defendant has been sufficiently
punished. See, e.g., Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277,282 (2d Cir. 1990)
(stating that the amounts of such premiums are "too speculative a basis for a
constitutional ruling" and that it was "far from clear that sums paid in private settlements
may validly be counted in determining when state-compelled punitive damages awards
exceed the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment").
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sovereign the prospect of state prosecution or punishment for a given
"offense" is deeply ingrained in American criminal jurisprudence.
This premise should also control, to the degree practicable, the states'
approach to punitive damages-which are, at their core, a form of
state-inflicted punishment. The current regime's approach to mass-
tort punishment flies in the face of this premise because it allows an
unlimited number of plaintiffs to seek punitive damages in a manner
that invites juries to punish repetitively the same misdeeds.
Furthermore, the threat of such awards builds repetitive punitive
premiums into the settlement process, ensuring that mass-tort
defendants suffer repeated "punishments" in that vast bulk of cases
that settle. Superbifurcation would lessen the danger of such
repetitive punishments by sharply limiting the number of punitive
damages actions; it also would largely eliminate the ability of many
plaintiffs to extract punitive premiums in settlement negotiations.
V. CONCLUSION
For over two hundred years, American and English courts have
recognized the power of juries to inflict discretionary punitive
damages "as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such
proceeding in the future, and a proof of the detestation of the jury to
the action itself."'3  Such awards are infrequent but, on rare
occasions, are astoundingly large. Their actual effects on the world
for good or ill are difficult to measure meaningfully. Under the
current system, plaintiffs seek and pocket these awards in whole or
part. This practice leads, among other problems, to plaintiff windfalls
and allows plaintiff financial incentives to taint the punishment
process. In addition, the current system leaves juries with an
alarmingly vast amount of discretion both to determine when
defendants are punitively liable (i.e., when they have behaved in a
"malicious" manner) and how harshly to punish. Furthermore, the
current system, by permitting each plaintiff allegedly hurt by a course
of conduct to seek punitive damages, invites particularly irrational
punishment of mass torts.
Adoption of the superbifurcation proposal would alleviate all
three of these problems while at the same time preserving the core of
the present system's power to punish and deter malicious torts.
Under the proposal, a plaintiff's reward for proving a defendant's
punitive liability would be reasonable attorney's fees, not a chance to
325. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489,498-99 (C.P. 1763).
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win punitive damages. Instead, state prosecutors would seek such
damages, which would be payable to the state. Removing the chance
for plaintiffs to win windfalls would end the taint that plaintiffs'
perfectly understandable desires for maximum recovery bring to the
punishment process. Giving prosecutors the authority to decide
whether to seek punitive damages and to set an upper limit on their
size would decrease juries' vast power to determine whether and how
harshly to punish. Lastly, adoption of the proposal would help
rationalize the punishment of mass torts by lessening the number of
punitive claims defendants could face and by removing such claims as
bargaining chips in many mass-tort settlement negotiations.
